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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 63-46(b)-14 and 16, § 78-2(a)-3 and Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the action of the Executive Secretary (UST) of the Utah Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Control Board (hereafter Executive Secretary") and the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Control Board (hereafter the "Board") in refusing to set aside the "default" Order of February 6, 1995 
by an Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Order dated November 20, 1995 under the provisions of 
Rule 60(b), constitutes an abuse of discretion, was arbitrary and capricious, and is unsupported by 
the evidence as presented to both the Executive Secretary and the Board. 
2. Whether the instructions contained in the Notice and Order of February 6, 1995 and 
accompanying letter from the Executive Secretary contained contrary instructions of requiring a 
written response within 30 days on the one hand and in contacting William Moore at the Department 
of Environmental Quality on the other, and whether such contrary instructions constitute a violation 
of due process based on "vagueness." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal by the Petitioner is taken from a decision by the Executive Secretary in an Order 
dated November 20, 1995 wherein the Executive Secretary refused to set aside the Petitioner's 
"default" regarding an Order of February 6, 1995 where the Petitioner was assessed fines in the 
amount of $29, 500.00, and the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board's decision to affirm 
the Executive Secretary's refusal to set aside the "default" by way of its Order of May 30, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. February 6, 1995 -- Kent P. Gray, the Executive Secretary, issued a Notice of 
Violation and Order [R. 002-005] regarding deliveries of petroleum products to the Hooper Country 
Store, a service station in Hooper Utah. (Attached as Addendum 1). 
2. Together with the Notice of Violation and Order, Trease received a letter of 
instructions [R. 001] which stated that Trease should contact William Moore of the DERR to 
schedule a meeting regarding questions as to the claims and fines contained in the Notice and Order. 
(Attached as Addendum 2). 
3. The Notice of Violation and Order included a fine for deliveries to the Hooper Store 
in the amount of $29,500.00. [R. 002-005]. 
4. The Notice of Violation and Order required a written response within 30 days. Within 
that time period, Trease telephoned William Moore at the DERR and requested a meeting with the 
intent of discussing the Hooper fines and other matters. A meeting was subsequently held on March 
22, 1995. Trease did not understand that regardless of the scheduled meeting, he was still required 
to provide a written response to the Notice of Violation and Order within the 30-day time limit. 
5. After the meeting with William Moore, Trease notified his attorney for the first time 
regarding the Notice of Violation and Order and was informed of the requirement of a written 
response. On April 4, 1995, counsel for Trease filed a written response to the Notice of Violation 
and Order. [R. 006-009]. (Attached as Addendum 3). 
6. Trease was informed by way of a letter to his counsel from the Executive Secretary, 
dated April 21, 1995 [R. 010-011], that the response to the Notice of Violation and Order was 
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untimely and therefore, that the Order is to be considered final as of March 6, 1995. (Attached as 
Addendum 4). 
7. May 10, 1995 - Trease filed a Motion to Set Aside the "Default" Order of January 
6, 1995 [R. 034-035] with the Executive Secretary, which Motion was accompanied by a 
Memorandum of Authorities and Affidavits setting forth Trease's defense on the merits in regard to 
the fines and requesting that pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the "default" Order should be set aside based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect. (Motion, Memorandum, and Affidavits attached as Addendum 5). 
8. The Motion to Set Aside the "Default" because of mistake, inadvertence or excusable 
neglect was based on the fact that when Trease received the Notice of Violation and Order [R. 006-
009] with an accompanying letter from Kent Gray [R. 010-011], Trease mistakenly understood that 
by contacting William Moore as instructed in the letter and scheduling an appointment, that he had 
fulfilled the requirements and "contested" the appropriateness of the Order. Trease was under the 
mistaken impression that a written response was not necessary due to the expectant meeting and 
discussions with Moore. 
9. In support of Trease's Motion to Set Aside the "default" [R. 034-035], Trease 
proffered evidence to the Executive Secretary that he has a valid and good faith defense to the 
issuance of fines in connection with deliveries to the Hooper Store. Trease expected to present 
evidence that even though he did not have a Certificate of Compliance, he understood that he could 
continue to make fuel deliveries to the Hooper Store service station as a result of conversations with 
employees of the Department of Environmental Quality (issues of waiver and estoppel). Trease's 
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arguments on the merits were supported by a Memorandum of Authorities and Affidavits. [R. 012-
033]. (Addendum 5). 
10. Trease's defenses to the issues of fines also included constitutional issues of due 
process. If given the opportunity to argue on the merits, Trease expected to claim that he had 
complied with all requirements to obtain a Certificate of Compliance under Utah Code Annotated § 
19-6-412, including payment of all relevant fees to obtain such a certificate, but that the State 
nevertheless wrongfully withheld the Certificate of Compliance without allowing Trease an 
opportunity to be heard or to otherwise challenge the issue before an impartial tribunal, and that the 
Department of Environmental Quality acted as prosecutor, judge, and jury in unilaterally deciding that 
Trease had not met the qualifications to have a Certificate of Compliance on the tanks at the Hooper 
Store. Failure to have a Certificate of Compliance and delivering gasoline to the Hooper Store was 
the basis of the fines issued in the Order of February 6, 1995. 
11. Based on the fact that Trease had valid defenses on the merits to the fines that were 
issued and that his failure to respond within 30 days to the Order of February 6, 1995 was only due 
to excusable neglect, mistake or inadvertence, the Motion to Set Aside the "default" [R. 034-035] 
was made to the Executive Secretary pursuant to Rule 60 (b). 
12. November 20, 1995 — The Executive Secretary entered an Order denying Trease's 
Motion to Set Aside the "default" Order of February 6, 1995. [R. 036-053]. (Attached as Addendum 
6). 
13. December 15, 1995 — Trease filed a Motion for Agency Review and Memorandum 
of Authorities with the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board, seeking review by the Board 
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of the Executive Secretary's denial of setting aside the "default". [R. 054-066]. (Attached as 
Addendum 7). 
14. The DERR filed a Motion to Dismiss Trease's Motion for Agency Review. [R. 075-
165]. 
15. May 9, 1996 ~ A hearing was held before the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Control Board regarding Trease's request for agency review. (Transcript of the relevant portion of 
the hearing attached as Addendum 8). [R. 213-239]. The Board denied the relief requested by Trease 
to set aside the original Notice and Order and granted that the DERR's Motion to Dismiss Trease's 
Motion for Agency Review. The Board issued its Order denying Trease's request for agency review 
on May 30, 1996. [R. 199-201]. (Attached as Addendum 9). 
16. The Notice of Appeal/Petition for Writ of Review was filed by Trease on June 28, 
1996. [R. 205-211]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Dan Trease received a Notice of Violation and Order and an accompanying letter from the 
Executive Secretary. Trease made an honest mistake in thinking that his contact of William Moore 
within 30 days and scheduling a meeting to discuss a number of pending matters, including the 
Hooper fines, was sufficient. Trease did not understand until after the 30 days had expired that he 
was also required to provide a written response. Hence, a "default" was entered against him. Trease 
made timely requests to have the "default55 Order set aside both to the Executive Secretary and to the 
Board, which requests were denied. The Executive Secretary and the Board's refusal to set aside the 
"default55 is arbitrary and capricious and constitutes an abuse of discretion under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. The refusal to set aside the "default55 is further unsupported by the 
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evidence presented both to the Executive Secretary and the Board. Finally, the fact that Trease 
received conflicting instructions requiring a 30-day written response on the one hand and a personal 
contact on the other, violated Trease's due process rights on the basis of'Vagueness". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE BOARD ABUSED 
THEIR DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO SET 
ASIDE THE "DEFAULT" ORDER 
Trease has admitted his inadvertent mistake in failing to respond in writing to the Notice of 
Violation and Order. '"Defaults", through inadvertence or mistake, take place occasionally and Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the methods of having "defaults" set aside under 
circumstances where justice and fairness so demand. Failure to set a default aside when the relevant 
factors have been met constitutes an abuse of discretion and is arbitrary and capricious. 
In this action, the Executive Secretary and subsequently the Board abused their discretion in 
failing to apply Rule 60(b)(1) which provides that an Order may be set aside for mistake, 
inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Trease was under the mistaken impression that contacting a 
representative of the DERR would satisfy the requirement of responding to the Notice of Violations 
and Order within 30 days. As a result of that mistake and misperception, Trease neglected to file a 
written response nor did he inform his counsel regarding the receipt of the Notice of Violations and 
Order until after the 30-day time limit had already passed. The DERR did not and cannot claim any 
prejudice from Trease's mistake. The 30-day response was due on March 6, 1995. A belated 
response to the Notice and Order was filed on April 4, 1995. It is inconceivable that a period of less 
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than 30 days constitutes an excuse or a basis for the Executive Secretary and/or the Board to deny 
Trease his day in court. 
Rule 60(b) unambiguously provides relief from mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. 
Trease's conduct in this case is at worst a reasonable mistake and he should have been allowed to 
present his case on the merits. Trease did not ignore or neglect the Notice of Violations and Order, 
he merely responded in the incorrect manner by scheduling a meeting. Trease is not an attorney and 
did not have the advice of an attorney until after the 30-day period for filing a response to the Notice 
of Violation and Order had passed. It is not unreasonable for a non-attorney to assume that 
contacting a representative of the State of Utah and scheduling a meeting within the 30 days would 
be a sufficient response. It is this type of mistake or inadvertence from which Rule 60(b) should 
provide relief, if Rule 60(b) is to have any meaning, particularly in light of the fact that an Objection 
and Response to the Notice of Violation and Order was filed within 30 days after the time that it was 
due. 
The purpose of Rule 60(b) is to farther justice and fairness by allowing a party who has made 
a mistake to have his case decided on the merits rather than by default. In this case, Trease was 
ordered to pay $29,500.00 in penalties without having the merits of the case considered. That 
constitutes a harsh and unreasonable punishment for failing to understand the regulation. Rule 60(b) 
should provide a remedy. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor. 554 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) as follows: 
. . . It is even more important to keep in mind that the very reason for 
the existence of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be 
heard and to do justice between them. In conformity with that 
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principle, the courts generally tend to favor granting relief from 
default judgments where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will 
result in substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party. 
544 P.2d at 879. 
In reviewing cases where the Appellate Court has upheld a trial court's refusal to set aside 
a default, it can be seen that in those cases, the defendant could not reasonably claim "mistake" or 
"inadvertence". For example, in Board of Education v. Cox. 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963), the default 
was affirmed where a defendant simply ignored a Summons against him, considering it to be "invalid." 
In JPW Enters. Inc. v. Naef 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 1979), the default was affirmed where a defendant 
claimed ignorance and naivete regarding the legal process, but admitted having discussed the matter 
with his attorney. A similar situation does not exist here with Trease. Trease did not ignore the 
Notice of Violation and Order, he was merely mistaken in his method of response, and a belated 
response was filed, but was rejected by the Executive Secretary. This court, in State v. Sixteen 
Thousand Dollars United States Currency. 914 P.2d 1176 (Utah App. 1996), recently affirmed that: 
Certainly a party may have a reasonable explanation for its default. If 
so, the party should proceed under Rule 60(b) to seek relief from the 
trial court. In the furtherance of justice, the trial court has discretion 
relieve a party from a default judgment where the party's default 
resulted from mistake, surprise, excusable neglect, misconduct by the 
other party, improper service or the like. . . . 
A trial court should be given an opportunity to correct errors of law 
as well as to excuse a defaulting party when reasonable so as to 
resolve any arising controversy before appeal. 
914P.2dat 1178, 1179. 
Trease applied both to the Executive Secretary and to the Board for relief under Rule 60(b). 
There is no reasonable basis for the Executive Secretary and/or the Board refusing to set aside this 
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default. Under the circumstances of this case, failure to do so is unreasonable and constitutes action 
which is arbitrary and capricious. 
Also, contrary to the Executive Secretary's assertion in his Order of November 20, 1995, 
Trease does have a meritorious defense to the fines that were issued. In his Order, the Executive 
Secretary makes reference to testimony and argues in effect that under the facts of this case (referring 
to the merits), Trease is not entitled to a defense under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. However, 
a party making a motion under Rule 60 (b) is not required to conclusively prove his case prior to 
having a default set aside. It certainly would not constitute judicial economy to require a party to in 
effect, "put on their entire case" prior to a court's consideration of a Rule 60(b) motion. Rather, in 
a context of a Rule 60(b) motion, a meritorious defense is merely one which sets forth specific and 
sufficiently detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one 
entered. See e.g. State of UtahT by and through Utah State Department of Social Services v. 
MussellmaiL 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983) and Downy State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp.. 545 P.2d 
507, 510 (Utah 1976). The meritorious defense rule only required Trease to proffer some defense 
of at least sufficient ostensible merit as would justify a trial of the issues thus raised. The 
Memorandum of Authorities and Affidavits submitted to the Executive Secretary and to the Board 
(Addendum 5) constitutes suflBcient information and proffer of evidence that Trease has a good faith 
defense to the fines that were issued. The default should have been set aside. 
9 
POINT II. 
TREASE WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER 
Trease has been fined $29,500.00 by way of a Notice of Violation and Order that together 
with a letter of instructions, was unconstitutionally vague. On the one hand, Trease received a letter 
which stated: 
Please find enclosed a Notice of Violation and Order regarding illegal 
deliveries, not obtaining a Certificate of Compliance, and not 
performing released detection for underground storage tanks at 
Facility I.D. No. 1200241. 
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact 
William Moore at (801) 536-4121. 
On the other hand, the Order contained a paragraph which began: 
Pursuant to 19-6-404(3) you may contest this Notice of Violation and 
Order by filing a written request for agency action to contest the 
Notice of Violation for it within 30 days after issuance. . . 
The requirement to provide a written response within 30 days is not underlined, it is not issued in 
ccbold" print, nor is a layman's attention particularly drawn to that portion of the Order in any other 
manner. (See Addendum 1). Issuing this Order, containing one set of instructions contained within 
a paragraph of a three page document and sending the Notice of Violation and Order with an 
accompanying letter which to the layman could be considered contrary instructions to "contact 
William Moore" regarding any questions, creates a situation of "Vagueness" as a result of which, 
Trease has been denied his due process. 
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A determination regarding the constitutionality of either a statute or in this case an Order, is 
a question of law. This Court in Russ v. Woodside Homes. Inc.. 905 P.2d 899 (Utah App. 1995) 
stated: 
Vagueness questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e. 
whether the statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct. 
905P.2dat901. 
The question in this case is whether or not the Order and accompanying letter are sufficiently 
explicit and not contradictory wherein the ordinary informed reader would understand what conduct 
is expected. In Stastny v. Board of Trustees. 647 P.2d 496 (Washington App. 1982), the court 
stated: 
The concept of unconstitutional vagueness means no prohibition can 
stand or penalty attach where an individual could not reasonable 
understand his contemplated conduct is prescribed [citation omitted]. 
Any statute, including a rule or regulation of an administrative agency 
which forbids an act in terms so vague persons of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, 
violates the first essential of due process of law [citations omitted]. 
647P.2dat505. 
Although the issue herein does not involve a statue, the principle remains the same. Trease 
received an Order and a letter of instructions with contradictory information which did not give clear 
instructions and is subject to misinterpretation by a person of average intelligence. The form of the 
Order and accompanying letter of instructions containing contradictory and confiising instructions 
resulted in denial of due process, as a result of which a "default" Order was entered against Trease. 
The default should be set aside and Trease should be allowed to have his day in court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Department of Environmental Quality issued an Order and fines against Trease, as to 
which a "default" was entered. The Executive Secretary and the Board refused to set aside the 
"default" Order to allow Trease to challenge the DEQ's actions. If Trease had been given the 
opportunity to have his day in court, he would have presented evidence regarding waiver and estoppel 
in connection with gasoline deliveries. Also, the matter of due process in connection with the 
issuance or revoking or refusing to issue Certificates of Compliance by the DERR would have seen 
the light of day and may have been the subject of review in a trial or Appellate Court. This Court has 
recently issued a ruling as to a somewhat related issue in V-1 Oil Company v. Department of 
Environmental Quality. 893 P.2d 1093 (Utah App. 1995). 
Trease has met the requirements of Rule 60(b). The Executive Secretary and the Board's 
refusal to set aside the "default" Order was an abuse of discretion and should be reversed. 
DATED this 3 r t L day of February, 1997. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, PC. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (USD OF THE 
UTAH SOLD) AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
In The Matter Of: 
Dan Trease 
5600 South 5900 West 
Hooper, Utah 84315 
NOTICE OF VIOLATIONS 
AND ORDER 
RE: Facility ID No. 1200241 
The Executive Secretary (US!} of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board ("Executive 
Secreiary (UST)M), issues an Notice of Violation and Order regarding illegal deliveries, failure to obtain a 
Certificate of Compliance by the due date, and performing release detection at Facility ID No. 120024J, where 
the USTs are owned and operated by Dan Trease ("you"). 
These proceedings are pursuant to the jurisdiction and authority provided in Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-
401 et seg., **<* ** Utah Adrain. Code R311-200 gg $£fl. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. You own and operate the three (3) Underground Storage Tanks (USTs), located at a facility known as 
Hooper Store, located at 5600 South 5500 West, Hooper. Utah, as attested in the Notification for 
Underground Storage Tanks you signed on May 8, 1986, and submitted to the Division of 
Environmental Response and Remediation (DERR). 
2. The three USTs have been registered with DERR by you, and have been assigned facility 
identification number 1200241. 
3. Utah Code Ann., § 19-6-412(l)b provides that effective July 1, 1991, each owner or operator of an 
UST shall have a Certificate of Compliance. 
4. Records maintained by DERR disclose that no Certificate of Compliance had been issued to the three 
(3) USTs located at the above-referenced facility until September 6, 1994, over one thousand one 
hundred sixty one (1161) days. 
6. 
7. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Documents submitted to DERR to obtain the Certificate of Compliance indicate the three pressurized 
lines and automatic line leak detectors associated with the three USTs, were not tested annually for the 
period between your May 29.1991. line tightness and automatic line teak detector tests, and your 
December 16,1993. line tightness and automatic line leak detector tests. This totals two times per line 
(of which there are three), and two times per automatic line leak detector (of which there are three) 
during that time period that the lines and automatic line leak detectors were not tested. 
Utah Admin. Code R311-202-1, Incorporating 40 Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR) 
5§ 280.41(bXD. 280.44(a), and 280.44(b) requires pressurized lines and automatic line leak detectors 
to be tested annually beginning December 22, 1990. 
DERR records show that from January 1. 1994, through October 31.1994, a total of over sixty nine 
(69) different deliveries of petroleum were made to the three (3) USTs, while those USTs were not 
covered by a Certificate of Compliance. This does not Include July 1994, for which the inventory 
records were not submitted. 
DERR records disclose that employees of Dan Trease made the sixty nine (69) deliveries of petroleum 
between January 1, 1994, and October 31, 1994. 
Utah Code Ann.. { 19-6-416(1) states that "no person may deliver petroleum to a petroleum UST if 
the owner or operator of the UST does not have a valid Certificate of Compliance". 
DERR. records disclose that employees of Dan Trease made two hundred and twenty four (224) other 
deliveries of petroleum to the three (3) USTs, while those USTs were not covered by a Certificate of 
Compliance, during the period from February 1, 1992, to December 31, 1993. 
VIOLATIONS 
As shown in paragraph 3, and 4, you violated Utah Code Ann„ ( 19-6-412(1 )b, by failing to obtain a 
Certificate of Compliance by July 1, 1991, for each UST located at the above-referenced facility. 
Under Utah Code Ann.. § 19-6-425(1). you are subject to a civil penalty of up to $10,000.00 for each 
day of this violation. 
As shown in paragraph 5, and 6. you violated Utah Admin. Code. R311-201-1, §§ 280.41(bXl), 
280.44(a), and 280.44(b), which requires the owner or operator of any pressurized line and the owner 
or operator of any automatic line leak detector to perform annual tests of their lines and automatic line 
leak detectors beginning December 22. 1990. Under Utah Code Ann.. $ 19-6-425(1). you are subject 
to a civil penalty of up to $10,000.00 for each occurrence of each of these violations. 
13. As shown in paragraph 7, 8, and 9, you committed sixty nine (69) violations of Utah Code 
Ann., } 19-6-416(1) within the last year, for which the penalty is $500.00 per violation. 
ORDER 
In accordance with Utah Code Ann., § 19-6-416(2) the Executive Secretary hereby assesses you a 
penalty of twenty nine thousand five hundred dollars (529,500,00), for 59 of the 69 violations set forth in 
paragraph 13 above, and Orders you to submit the penalty within 30 days. 
Pursuant to 19-6-404(3). you may contest this Notice of Violation and Order by filing a written 
request for Agency Action to contest the Nodce of Violation for it within 30 days after issuance. The Request 
for Agency Action should be filed with The Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board, 168 North 1950 
West, 1st Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. A copy must be mailed to Kent P. Gray, Executive Secretary 
(UST), 168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. If you do not contest this Notice of 
Violation and Order as described above, the facts specified herein will be deemed true and not subject to 
contest in future administrative or judicial proceedings, and you will forfeit any right to proceed with an 
administrative or judicial appeal. 
The Executive Secretary intends to seek the maximum civil penalties for each of the other violations 
stated above. 
4 day of EuV Dated this to  f r+W 1995 
Kent P. Gray, Executive Sec&&iy(UST) 
Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
KPG/WEM/cb 
RETURN ON NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER 
Personal 
STATE OF UTAH )
 ss< SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
T h«r«bv certify and return that I received the within and 
hereto %SSU Notice7 of Violation and Order on the 7th day of 
February, 1995. 
T served the same upon Dan Trease the within named^Defendant, 
I ••rve? ™ * *r~ .JJT
 t o a n d leaving with »aid Defendant at, 
personally, b y f t ^ v c " n g _ * ° ^ V , State of Utah, a true copy of 
se°ia NOotice59o0f° vi^atL^andTrdVr on the 9th day of February, 
1995. 
or T served the within named Defendant, by delivering 
or I s e r v e a , . u nerson of suitable age and 
to and leaving with f™ed at the usual place of abode 
t f l l l f l l i ^ t S E T " ^ Se~1n0w\£r-CUounty,PStata o f Utah 
a true copy of said on the 
-» 4.K- «*m» unon the wi th in named 
Or I served the same upon «-«»• ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Uated a t ogdan. Otah, t h i . 10th day of February, 1993. 
CRAIG DEARDEN 
Sharif* of Mebar County, Stata of Utah 
* *rv .,X« flhaH#^ ay" r - j 
Deputy Sheriff 
Sheriff Fees: $N/C 
ADDENDUM 2 
Michad 0 . Le-ovirt 
Coventor 
Dianoe R. Niettoa. Fh D 
Extcmivt Director 
Kent P. Gny 
Director 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE AND REMEDIATION 
)6S North 1950 Wett Ut Floor 
SdtUk«Ciry, Uuh$4M6 
(801) 536-4100 
(801) 359-8853 FAX 
(801) 536-44M TD.D. 
ERRU-450-94 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Februaiy 7, 1995 
Dan Trcasc 
5600 South 5900 West 
Hooper, Utah 84315 
RE: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER 
FACILITY ID # 1200241 
Dear Mr. Trease: 
Please find enclosed an Notice of Violation and Order regarding illegal deliveries, not 
obtaining a Certificate of Compliance, and not performing Release Detection for Underground Storage 
Tanks (USTs) at Facility ID # 1200241. 
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact WilUam Moore at 
(801)536-4121. 
Sincerely, 
Kent P. Gray, Executive Secretary (UST) 
Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
GAVEM/cb 
Enclosure 
ce: Sandra K. Allen, DERR attorney 
EPA Region VTII 
Fred Nelson, Attorney General's Office 
Craig Hentnger, M.S., Acting Director, Weber/Morgan District Health Department 
ADDENDUM 3 
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (UST) OF THE 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
In The Matter Of: i 
Dan Trease : 
5600 South 5900 West ! 
Hooper, Utah 84315 J 
: RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF 
! VIOLATIONS AND ORDER 
\ RE: Facility ID No. 1200241 
Dan Trease submits this Response and Objection to the Notice 
of Violations and Order as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to the Notice of Violations and Order and 
accompanying letter of February 7, 1995 from Kent P. Gray, 
Executive Secretary, Dan Trease contacted William Moore and a 
meeting was scheduled between Mr. Trease and Mr. Moore for March 
10, 1995 for the purpose of discussing the Findings of Fact and 
Order, and to further discuss an appropriate response thereto. The 
meeting was subsequently continued to March 22, 1995, at which time 
Mr. Trease met with Mr. Moore at the offices of the DERR. Mr. 
Moore requested further information regarding the Hooper site and 
another meeting between Mr. Moore and Mr. Trease will be scheduled 
to further discuss this matter within the next two weeks. In the 
meantime, Dan Trease, pursuant to § 19-6-404(3) contests and 
objects to the Notice of Violations and Order, as issued, on the 
following basis: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. As to Paragraph 1, Trease agrees that he is the owner of 
three underground storage tanks located at the Hooper Country 
Store. However, Trease does not operate the Hooper County Store 
and service station. The service station is operated by Wayne 
Wilson and owned by the Kilts Family Trust. 
2. Trease admits the Findings of Fact contained in 
Paragraphs 2 and 3. 
3. As to the Findings of Fact contained in Paragraph 4, 
Trease admits that no Certificate of Compliance had been issued 
until September 6, 1994
 # but affirmatively allege that the 
Certificate of Compliance was wrongfully withheld by the State of 
Utah. 
4. The allegations contained in Paragraph 5 are incorrect in 
that tank tightness tests were performed between May 29, 1991 and 
December 16, 1993. 
5. As to Paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact, the 
"provisions sited" speak for themselves. 
6. As to Paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Findings of Fact# 
Trease admits that a number of deliveries were made to the 
underground storage tanks at the Hooper Country Store, but 
affirmatively alleges that the State of Utah/DERR has waived the 
requirements regarding a Certificate of Compliance in regards to 
those deliveries. DERR representatives were and have been aware at 
all times of the on-going dispute between Trease and the DERR in 
regards to issuing the Certificate of Compliance and were and have 
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been aware at all times that fuel deliveries were being made to the 
Hooper Country Store site since 1991. Although to the 
understanding and best knowledge of Trease# the site has qualified 
for a Certificate of Compliance, the State has wrongfully failed to 
issue such Certificate of Compliance, presumably based on a dispute 
over the responsibility of clean-up of any contamination on the 
site. Further, Trease on a number of occasions, specifically asked 
representatives of DERR if he should discontinue fuel deliveries to 
the Hooper Country Store site until a Certificate of Compliance has 
been issued and the dispute resolved, and at no time was Trease 
instructed to stop those deliveries. Trease reasonably understood 
that the State was allowing Trease to continue with deliveries 
until the on-going dispute regarding contamination and clean-up at 
the site, and regarding the qualifications for the Certificate of 
Compliance had been resolved. Trease reasonably relied on the 
actions and statements of DERR representatives in regards to fuel 
delivery and the State of Utah/DERR is, therefore, estopped from 
fining Trease based on those fuel deliveries. The Certificate of 
Compliance issued in September of 1994 was issued without any 
further action on the part of Trease and should, in fact, have been 
issued in 1991. 
VIOLATIONS 
7. Trease objects to the violations as outlined in 
Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 and resulting fines issued in regards to 
said violations based on the facts as outlined in Paragraph 6 
above. 
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ORDER 
8. Pursuant to instructions contained in the Order and in 
the letter of February 7, 1995 to Dan Trease, Trease responded to 
the Order and has contested said Order by way of conversations and 
meetings with William Moore of the DERR. Trease supplements his 
previous responses and objections to the Notice of Violation and 
Order as outlined herein. 
DATED this Jj£L day of April, 1995. 
KIPP/iAND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
fhler 
>r Dan Trease 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, postage prepaid, this V^ day of April, 1995, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF 
VIOLATION AND ORDER, to the following: 
Executive Secretary (UST) 
Utah Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Control Board 
168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Kent P. Gray 
Executive Secretary (UST) 
Utah Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Control Board 
168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
/5wf<2^/o. 
ADDENDUM 4 
Staic 01 L tan 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE AND REMEDIATION 
Michael 0 . Uavm 16S North 1950 W « i 
Gov«nx*
 p 0 B o x | 4 4 g 4 0 
Dunne R. Nicison. Ph D. Sail Lake City. Utah 84114-4840 
lxccw*t D,rtocr
 ( g 0 I ) 5 3 ^ , 0 0 VoiCC 
Kent P. Cray (801) 359-8853 Fax 
Director (801) 536-4414 T D.D 
ERRA-031-95 
April 21, 1995 
Heinz J. Mahler 
Attorney for Dan Trease 
Kipp & Christian 
175 East 400 South #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Facility ED No. 1200241 
Dear Mr. Mahler: 
I received your Response to Notice of Violations and Order on April 4, 1995. I issued 
the Notice of Violation and Order to your client, Dan Trease, on February 6, 1995. The Notice 
of Violation and Order explicitly states that a request for agency action to contest the order must 
be filed within 30 days of the date of issuance. The 30 day time limit is established in rules 
R311-210-3 and R311-210-4 of the Utah State Bulletin (November L 1994). Because your 
request for agency action to contest my order is late and you have not followed the rules for 
having my order set aside, your response cannot be treated as a request for agency action to 
contest my order before the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board-
Rule R311-210-3(e) provides that a party seeking to have an initial order set aside must 
file a motion and supporting memorandum and affidavits with me. Such memorandums and 
affidavits must provide factual and legal support for the motion based upon the standards for 
having a default order set aside set forth in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If 
I deny such a motion, the party may file a request for agency action with the Board to contest 
my decision not to set aside the order. The Board may not hear the substantive issues contesting 
my initial order if the party's request to set aside my initial order has not been granted. A copy 
of Rule R311-210-3(e) is enclosed for your convenience. 
Be advised that I will automatically deny any motion you file to set aside my order unless 
your motion and supporting documents are received and date stamped by the Division of 
Environmental Response and Remediation before 5:00 p.m. on May 10, 1995. In the meantime, 
I will continue to treat the order as final. 
mm 
Pnnt«Sonr»cyc*dW* * 
Page 2 
If you have any questions, please feel free to call, Sandra AJlen, who is an attorney at my 
office, at 536-4100. 
KPG/SA/aJ 
Enclosure(s) 
Sincerely, 
AJP 
Kyft P. Gray, Executive Secretary (UST) 
Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
cc: Doug Credille 
The Dan Trease Adjudicative File No. UST-1200241-2-6-95 
t^Sandra Allen 
Bill Moore 
ADDENDUM 5 
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (UST) OF THE 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
In The Matter 
Dan Trease 
Of: ! 
5600 South 5900 West i 
Hooper, Utah 84315 ! 
! MOTION TO 
: RE: 
SET 
Facility 
ASIDE 
ID NO. 
ORDER 
1200241 
Dan Trease, by and through counsel, hereby moves, pursuant to 
the provisions of Rule 60(b)(1) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Rule R311-210-3(e) of the Utah State Bulletin to set 
aside the Order of Kent P. Gray, Executive Secretary (UST), Utah 
Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board, dated February 6, 1995. 
This Motion is based upon the accompanying Memorandum of 
Authorities, which establishes that the Order should be set aside 
in the interest of justice. 
DATED this J_ day of May, 1995. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 1995, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER, 
was hand-delivered to the following: 
Utah Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Control Board 
168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Kent P. Gray 
Executive Secretary (UST) 
168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
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THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (UST) OF THE 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
• 
I n The M a t t e r Of: : MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES 
: IN SUPPORT OF 
Dan Trease : MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER 
5600 South 5900 West : 
Hooper, Utah 84315 : 
: RE: Facility ID No. 1200241 
Dan Trease, by and through counsel, submits this Memorandum of 
Authorities in Support of his Motion to Set Aside Order of February 
6, 1995 in regards to the above-referenced facility: 
FACTS 
1. On February 6, 1995, Kent P. Gray, Executive Secretary 
(UST), Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Board, issued a Notice 
of Violations and Order regarding the site located at the Hooper 
County Store, Hooper, Utah. 
2. Pursuant to said notice, Trease contacted William Moore 
and scheduled an appointment with Mr. Moore to meet regarding the 
Notice of Violations, Findings of Fact, and Order, which meeting 
was to take place on March 10, 1995. Subsequently, due to 
conflicting schedules, the meeting with Mr. Moore was changed to 
March 22, 1995, at which time Mr. Trease met with Mr. Moore at the 
offices of the DEQ/DERR. (Affidavit of Dan Trease, paragraphs 14-
16) 
3. At the above-referenced meeting, Mr. Moore requested 
further information regarding the Hooper Country Store site and 
another meeting between Mr. Moore and Mr. Trease was to be 
scheduled in the near future. 
4. A response to Notice of Violations and Order was filed on 
behalf of Trease on April 4, 1995. 
5. Trease was informed by way of a letter to his counsel, 
dated April 21, 1995, that the response to Notice of Violations and 
Order was not timely. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FAILURE OF TREASE TO RESPONSE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS 
WAS DUE TO A MISTAKE, INADVERTENCE AND 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
Rule R311-210-3 and R311-210-4 of the Utah State Bulletin 
requires that a request for agency action to contest an Order must 
be filed within thirty days of the issuance of such Order. Trease 
received the Notice of Violations and Order on or about February 7, 
1995, along with a letter from Kent P. Gray, Executive Secretary 
(UST), Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Board, stating: "If 
you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact 
William Moore at (801) 536-4121." 
When Trease received the aforementioned letter from Kent Gray, 
along with the Notice of Violations and Order, Trease understood 
that contacting William Moore and scheduling an appointment with 
William Moore within thirty days, fulfilled the requirements of 
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Rules R311-210-3 and R311-210-4. Trease was under the mistaken 
impression that meetings with Mr. Moore on March 22, 1995, would 
toll any relevant time period requiring a written response. 
(Affidavit of Dan Trease, paragraphs 118 and 19) 
When counsel for Trease was informed of the Notice of 
Violations and Order, the thirty days had already expired. 
However, a written response to the Notice of Violations and Order 
was filed on April 4, 1995. Trease was informed by Kent Gray, by 
way of a letter to counsel for Trease dated April 21, 1995, that 
his response was untimely and would not be considered. 
Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that an Order may be set aside for mistake, inadvertence, or 
excusable neglect. Trease is not an attorney and was under the 
mistaken impression that contacting William Moore would satisfy his 
responsibilities and requirements of responding to the Notice of 
Violations and Order. Based on that mistake and misperception, 
Trease neglected to inform his counsel of receipt of the Notice of 
Violations and Order until after the thirty-day requirement had 
already passed. 
Trease acted on a reasonable, although mistaken assumption, 
that his contacts and scheduled meetings with William Moore would 
satisfy the requirements to respond to the Notice of Violations and 
Order and would toll any relevant time period. Because of the 
mistaken understanding and inadvertent actions of Trease, Trease 
respectfully requests that the Order be set aside and that the 
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Board consider the merits of Trease ' s arguments regarding the fines 
issued, pursuant to the Order of February 6, 1995. 
POINT I I 
TREASE REASONABLY RELIED ON STATEMENTS AND 
ACTIONS OF DEQ/DERR OFFICIALS IN REGARDS 
TO FUEL DELIVERY TO THE HOOPER COUNTRY STORE 
WITHOUT A CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
During 1991, when the requirement for a Certificate of 
Compliance came into effect, Trease submitted an appropriate 
application to receive a Certificate of Compliance in connection 
with the Hooper Country Store. (Affidavit of Dan Trease, 
paragraph 4) Subsequently, the family of Michael and Allison 
Jones, residing west of the Hooper Country Store, claimed that 
gasoline spills during the filling process of the underground 
storage tanks have contaminated their property, causing them 
injuries and damages, and endangering their health. (Affidavit of 
Dan Trease, paragraph 5) Trease understood that, as a result of 
this claim and the subsequent lawsuit that was filed by the Jones 
family, that his Certificate of Compliance, as to the Hooper 
Country Store, was being withheld by the State of Utah. (Affidavit 
of Dan Trease, paragraphs 6 and 7) Several conversations took 
place between Trease and Shelley Quick during the years 1991 
through 1994 regarding the contamination at and surrounding the 
Hooper Country Store site and the claim that Trease was 
responsible for such contamination. In all of these conversations, 
Trease has continually denied responsibility for more than a minor 
part of the contamination at the site. 
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During several conversations held between Trease and Shelley 
Quick, Trease specifically asked the question of Shelley Quick as 
to whether or not Trease should stop gasoline and fuel deliveries 
to the Hooper Country Store until the Jones lawsuit had been 
resolved and until a Certificate of Compliance had been issued. 
Each time the subject came up, Shelley Quick made specific 
statements and representations that, "No11, it was not required of 
Trease to stop making fuel deliveries and that the State of Utah 
was not demanding that gasoline and fuel deliveries cease, 
regardless of the Certificate of Compliance having been issued or 
not. (Affidavit of Dan Trease, paragraphs 8, 9 and 12; Affidavit 
of Wayne Wilson, paragraphs 4 and 5; and Affidavit of Nedra Trease, 
paragraph 3) 
During all relevant times herein, Trease was of the 
understanding, and reasonably relied upon such understanding, that 
as a result of the conversations with Shelley Quick, Trease may 
continue fuel deliveries to the Hooper Country Store, and that the 
issue of a Certificate of Compliance would be resolved after the 
Jones lawsuit had been settled or come to judgment. In fact, 
shortly after the Jones lawsuit was settled, the State of Utah dig 
issue a Certificate of Compliance as to the Hooper Country Store, 
as Trease expected would occur. (Affidavit of Dan Trease, 
paragraphs 10 and 11) 
At no time during Trease's conversations with and direct 
questions on the subject to Shelley Quick, or other representatives 
of the DEQ/DERR, was Trease informed, instructed or told in any 
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way, that he must stop making fuel deliveries to the Hooper Country 
Store until a Certificate of Compliance had been issued or that he 
would be fined in the future. In fact, as a result of said 
conversations, Trease's understanding was the opposite, i.e., that 
he may continue making such deliveries. 
Trease reasonably relied on the statements on the part of 
Shelley Quick in continuing making gasoline and fuel deliveries to 
the Hooper Country Store during the pendency of the Jones lawsuit, 
even though no Certificate of Compliance had been issued. Had 
Trease been aware that he would be fined for such deliveries in the 
future, Trease would not have made such deliveries, and would have 
ceased making deliveries in 1991. 
As a result of the reasonable reliance of Trease on the 
statements of Shelley Quick and the fact that the State waited 
almost 4 years to take any action, the State of Utah is now 
estopped from fining Trease for delivering gasoline and fuel to the 
Hooper Country Store. 
Utah law recognizes the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Dixon 
v. Stoddard, 627 P.2d 83 (Utah 1981). An intent to waive a right 
can be implied from the conduct and statements of the parties. In 
Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Company, Inc., 831 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 
1992), the court held: 
The intent to relinquish a right can be 
implied from conduct, if the parties conduct 
unequivocally evidences an intent to waive or 
is at least consistent with any other intent . 
. . Furthermore, one cannot prevent a waiver 
by a private mental reservation contrary to an 
intent to waive where his or her actions 
clearly indicate such an intent. B. R. 
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WoodwardP 754 P. 2d 103. For example, in B. R. 
Woodward, the court found Woodward waived its 
right to monthly sales commissions under an 
agreement by waiting over a year and a half 
before making its first claim. Woodward 
claimed he intended only to delay enforcement 
of its rights, not waive them. The court 
stated that Woodward could not prevent waiver 
by private mental reservation when its conduct 
indicated an intent to waive the right to 
commissions. 
In this case, the actions and statements of the DEQ/DERR, and 
specifically, Shelley Quick, constitute a waiver of the State's 
right to fine Trease for fuel deliveries. During the past four 
years, the State has always been aware of the fuel deliveries, and 
due to its actions and statements of its agent, Trease reasonably 
relied, to his detriment in continuing to make such fuel 
deliveries. The State is now equitably estopped from issuing fines 
related thereto. 
In Holland v. Career Service Review Board, 856 P.2d 678 (Utah 
App. 1993), the court, in holding that the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel can be asserted against the State of Utah or its 
institutions, stated: 
The elements necessary to invoke equitable 
estoppel are: 
(1) A statementf admission, act, or failure 
to act by one party inconsistent with a 
claim later asserted; 
(2) Reasonable action or inaction by the 
other party taken on the basis of the 
first party's statement, admission, act 
or failure to act; and 
(3) Injury to the second party that would 
result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, 
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admission, act or failure to act. 
(emphasis added) 
See also, Horton v. Utah State Tax Commission, 864 P.2d 904 
(Utah App. 1993). 
For almost four years, the State of Utah, through its agents 
of the DEQ/DERR had knowledge that Trease was making fuel 
deliveries to the Hooper Country Store and that a Certificate of 
Compliance in connection with said store was being withheld. Due 
to the ongoing litigation with the Jones family and the ongoing 
dispute as to responsibility for clean-up at the site, there was 
contact between Trease and the State of Utah on numerous occasions 
over the past four years, practically on a monthly basis. Although 
Trease specifically asked on a number of occasions if he should 
cease making fuel deliveries due to not having a Certificate of 
Compliance, he was always informed "No," and that he should not 
shut down his gasoline deliveries to the Hooper Country Store. Had 
the State acted in 1991 or even in 1992 by issuing an Order and 
fine in regards to his Certificate of Compliance, or if statements 
made by Shelley Quick had not been made, then a different situation 
would exist. However, Trease reasonably relied on the passage of 
time, on the knowledge of the State of Utah for almost 4 years 
regarding the fuel deliveries, and on statements made by Shelley 
Quick, as a representative of the DEQ/DERR, in continuing to make 
those fuel deliveries. Principles of equitable estoppel now bar 
the State of Utah from issuing fines pursuant to the Order of 
February 6, 1995. 
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CONCLUSION 
In a recent conference held in Salt Lake City discussing 
underground storage tank issues, Paul Ashton, President of the Utah 
Petroleum Retailers Association, stated: 
The way they have been doing it, they have 
been trying to clean up stuff that doesn't 
matter and destroying small business people in 
the process. 
As a small business owner, Trease has made reasonable attempts 
to comply with State regulations and reasonably relied on State 
actions in continuing fuel deliveries to the Hooper Country Store. 
It should not be the public policy of the State of Utah to force 
small business owners out of business resulting in only large 
companies being able to remain in the gasoline business in this 
state. 
Manifest injustice would result if Trease were to be fined as 
a result of his reliance for the past four years on the statements 
and actions of officials of the DEQ/DERR. Based on the foregoing, 
Trease respectfully requests that the Order of Kent P. Gray, 
Executive Secretary (UST), Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control 
Board, dated February 6, 1995, be set aside and that no fines be 
issued. 
DATED this J3L day of May, 1995. 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 1995, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER was hand-delivered to the 
following: 
Utah Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Control Board 
168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Kent P. Gray 
Executive Secretary (UST) 
168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
-ti.c.^LQkL 
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THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (UST) OF THE 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
In The Matter Of: 
Dan Trease 
5600 South 5900 West 
Hooper, Utah 84315 
AFFIDAVIT OF NEDRA TREASE 
RE: Facility ID No. 1200241 
I, Nedra Trease, under oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am the wife of Dan Trease and assist Dan Trease in the 
operation of Dan Trease Distributing. 
2. On several occasions over the last three years, Shelley 
Quick of the DEQ/DERR has come to our office in Hooper, Utah, 
located approximately one block south of the Hooper Country Store. 
3. I specifically recollect being present on one occasion 
when Shelley Quick was in our office. Discussions had been held 
regarding the lack of a Certificate of Compliance, contamination 
problems, the claims of the Jones family, etc. I specifically 
recollect Dan Trease asking Shelley Quick if he should stop making 
gasoline and fuel deliveries to the Hooper Country Store, and 
asking if he should shut the gasoline deliveries down, making the 
statement: "I am tired of feeling like a criminal." I 
specifically recollect Shelley Quick responding "No,11 and then 
saying something to the effect that: "I don't want you to shut 
down," referring to gasoline deliveries to the Hooper Country 
Store. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this 6* day of May, 1995 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
NEDRA TREASE, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in 
the foregoing Affidavit are true, accurate, and complete to the 
best of her knowledge and belief. 
NEDRA TREASE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this i * day of May, 1995. 
November 3 ^ 8 No 
SWeot Utah _ _ $fe si<Ji nx 
5. Since I make my living in part by selling gasoline at the 
Hooper Country Store, I was pleased that Shelley Quick made that 
statement, since I did not want Dan Trease to stop fuel deliveries 
due to the fact that no Certificate of Compliance had been issued 
at that time. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this JjL day of May, 1995 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
WAYNE WILSON, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in 
the foregoing Affidavit are true, accurate, and complete to the 
best of his knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this £ day of Hay, 1995< 
HEINZ / MAHLER | 
175E.400S. Ste.330 | 
SaltUke City. Utah M i 11 •• 
My Commisccn E: Ires INO 
Slate'. 0. i j K e s i 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 1995, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE WILSON 
was hand-delivered to the following: 
Utah Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Control Board 
168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Kent P. Gray 
Executive Secretary (UST) 
168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
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THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (UST) OF THE 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
In The Matter Of: i 
Dan Trease ; 
5600 South 5900 West i 
Hooper, Utah 84315 ; 
i AFFIDAVIT OF DAN TREASE 
: RE: Facility ID No. 1200241 
I, Dan Trease, under oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am the owner of Dan Trease Distributing. My business 
includes delivery of gasoline and diesel fuel to the Hooper Country 
Store, located in Hooper, Utah. 
2. The gasoline and diesel fuel delivered to the Hooper 
Country Store is sold by its operator, Wayne Wilson, on a 
consignment basis. 
3. I own the gasoline and diesel fuel tanks at the Hooper 
Country Store and the related pumps and equipment. I do not own or 
operate the gasoline station and convenience store at the Hooper 
Country Store. 
4. I became aware of the requirements to obtain a 
Certificate of Compliance, in relation to gasoline and fuel 
deliveries in 1991 and proceeded to submit applications to obtain 
a Certificate of Compliance in connection with the Hooper Country 
Store before the deadline of July 1, 1991. 
5. During this general time frame, the Jones family, living 
west of the Hooper Country Store, claimed that gasoline from 
overfills of the underground storage tanks has contaminated their 
ground, causing injuries and damages. Subsequently, a lawsuit was 
filed by the Jones family against me in regards to these claims. 
6. It was my understanding from discussions with Shelley 
Quick, that the reason my Certificate of Compliance was withheld 
and not granted, was a result of the claims being made by the Jones 
family and that, therefore, I was to submit a site evaluation plan 
and begin clean-up of areas that I did not feel that I was 
responsible for. 
7. I understood and expected that once the lawsuit by the 
Jones family and related clean-up issues had been resolved, that 
the Certificate of Compliance would be issued to me in relation to 
the Hooper Country Store. 
8. During the time that the Jones JLawsuit was still pending, 
I had a number of conversations with Shelley Quick of the DEQ/DERR. 
During those conversations, I asked on several occasions whether I 
should stop delivery of gasoline to the Hooper Country Store, due 
to the fact that no Certificate of Compliance had been issued. 
Each time I asked that question, I understood that Shelley Quick 
said "no" and was not demanding that I stop gasoline deliveries. 
9. On one occasion I specifically asked "Do you want me to 
stop deliveries, close the tanks and shut the station down?" 
Again, Shelly Quick said "No.11. 
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10. It was always my understanding during the pendency of the 
Jones lawsuit that I would not be penalized for gasoline deliveries 
to the Hooper Country Store due to the lack of having a Certificate 
of Compliance. This understanding was based on my conversations as 
described above with Shelley Quick, who knew I did not have a 
Certificate of Compliance and told me I did not have to stop 
deliveries and shut the station down. 
11. I reasonably relied on statements made by Shelley Quick 
in regards to the Certificate of Compliance and my continuation of 
gasoline deliveries to the Hooper Country Store in continuing to 
make those deliveries. Had I been aware of, or had I been informed 
that I would be fined in the future for making these deliveries, I 
would have stopped making those deliveries when the issue first 
arose. 
12. During all the conversations I have had with Shelley 
Quick when the question regarding gasoline and fuel deliveries to 
the Hooper Country Store came up, I was never told, instructed, or 
informed in any way, that the gasoline and fuel deliveries should 
stop. In fact, from conversations I had and the statements that 
were made, I was of the specific understanding that, although a 
Certificate of Compliance had not been issued, that the State was 
aware I was making these deliveries, I could continue making these 
gasoline deliveries. 
13. I believe it is unfair and unjust to penalize me and fine 
me at this time as a result of ray reliance on statements made over 
the years regarding fuel deliveries and a Certificate of 
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Compliance, all of which has always been open and above board, and 
known to Shelley Quick. 
14. As to the Notice of Violations and Order received from 
Kent P. Gray on approximately February 7, 1995, after reading the 
Notice of Violations and Order, I contacted William Moore and 
scheduled a meeting with Mr. Moore for March 10, 1995, to discuss 
the claims and fines contained in the Notice of Violations and 
Order. 
15. It was my understanding that by contacting Mr. Moore, 
that I had complied with the requirement to respond to the Notice 
of Violations and Order within thirty days. 
16. Subsequently, my appointment with Mr. Moore was continued 
to March 22, 1995. 
17. After my meeting with Mr. Moore, I notified my attorney 
for the first time regarding the Notice of Violations and Order and 
was informed that a written response would be necessary. 
18. My attorney did file a written response on April 4, 1995. 
However, due to my mistaken understanding regarding my meetings 
with Mr. Moore, the Response to the Notice of Violations and Order 
was not filed within the required thirty days. 
19. I was under the mistaken impression that by making an 
appointment and meeting with Mr. Moore that the time to respond 
would be tolled and that if my meeting with Mr. Moore did not 
resolve the problems, that I would still have time to file a 
response. 
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20. My attorney has since received a letter from Kent Gray, 
Executive Secretary (UST) Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control 
Board, dated April 21, 1995, informing me that I was mistaken in 
ray assumptions, and that my response to the Notice of Violations 
and Order was not timely, 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this Jg?l day of May, 1995 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DAN TREASE, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the 
foregoing Affidavit are true, accurate, and ^ mplete to the best of 
his knowledge and belief. 
DAN TREASE 
SUBSCRI^D J^I^^vraR^TO^before me this £ _ day of May, 1995. 
r "IrfanSC "" "" ~ "RotoTpubBo *" "" "1 
HEINZ J. MAHLER | 
My Commission Expi. __ 
November 3,1993 I 
^ ^ S t a t e o m t i h ^ ^ j No 
~~" Res id i 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 1995, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DAN TREASE, was 
hand-delivered to the following: 
Utah Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Control Board 
168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Kent P. Gray 
Executive Secretary (UST) 
168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
i£j.*<jXiJ*J tflr,^ 
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ADDENDUM 6 
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (UST) OF THE 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
In the matter of: 
DAN TREASE 
5600 South 5900 West 
Hooper, Utah 84315 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE ORDER 
FACILITY NO. 1200241 
Based on the facts and for the reasons set forth below, the Executive Secretary (UST) of 
the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board ("Executive Secretary (UST)") hereby denies 
the Motion to Set Aside Order (sometimes referred to hereinafter as "the Motion") submitted by 
Dan Trease ("Mr. Trease") on May 10, 1995. The Motion requested that the Notice of Violations 
and Order issued by the Executive Secretary (UST) on February 6, 1995 (sometimes referred to 
hereinafter as "the February 6,1995 Order") against the above-referenced facility ("Facility"), and 
which became final on March 6, 1995 as prescribed by 2 Utah Admin. Code R311-210-3(d) 
(April 1, 1995), be set aside in accordance with the procedures outlined under 2 Utah Admin. 
Code R31 l-210-3(e) (April 1, 1995). This Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Order responds 
to the arguments presented in the Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion to Set Aside 
Order ("Memorandum of Authorities") which accompanied the Motion. This Order Denying 
Motion to Set Aside Order hereby incorporates and references the February 6, 1995 Order, 
including the findings of fact stated therein. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
In addition to the findings of fact contained in the February 6, 1995 Order incorporated 
herein, the Executive Secretary (UST) finds the following: 
1. On February 6, 1995, the Executive Secretary (UST) issued a Notice of Violations and 
Order assessing penalties of $29,500 against Mr. Trease for making fifty-nine (59) 
petroleum deliveries to the Facility while the Facility was without a Certificate of 
Compliance in violation of Utah Code Unann. § 19-6-416 (1995). 
2. Because Mr. Trease also owned the Facility and was one of the operators, the February 
6, 1995 Order also noted other violations which could be assessed a penalty of up to 
$10,000 per day for each violation under Utah Code Unann. § 19-6-425(1) (1995). 
The February 6, 1995 Order provided that Mr. Trease could contest the February 6, 1995 
Order by filing a written request for agency action with the Utah Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Control Board ("Board") within thirty (30) days as prescribed by 2 Utah Admin. 
Code R31 l-210-4(a), (b) (April 1, 1995). The February 6,19945 Order specifically stated 
that "if you do not contest this Notice of Violation and Order as described above, the 
facts specified herein will be deemed true and not subject to contest in future admin-
istrative or judicial proceedings, and you will forfeit any right to proceed with an 
administrative or judicial appeal." p. 3. (emphasis added). 
Sometime after the February 6, 1995 Order was issued, Mr. Trease scheduled a meeting 
with Bill Moore, a scientist in the Underground Storage Tank (UST) Section of the 
DERR, for March 10, 1995. See Bill Moore Affidavit, paragraph 14. The March 10, 
1995 meeting was subsequently moved to March 22, 1995 at the request of Mr. Trease. 
Id. at paragraph 15. 
The March 22,1995 meeting between Bill Moore and Mr. Trease took place as scheduled. 
According to Bill Moore, Mr. Trease did not mention the February 6, 1995 Order or 
imply that the meeting was intended to in any way contest the February 6, 1995 Order. 
Id. at paragraph 17. 
Because Mr. Trease did not contest the February 6, 1995 Order by filing a request for 
agency action with the Board within thirty (30) days, the February 6, 1995 Order became 
final on March 6, 1995 pursuant to 2 Utah Admin. Code R311-210-3(d) (April 1, 1995). 
On April 4, 1995, almost a month beyond the thirty (30) day deadline for contesting the 
February 6, 1995 Order, Mr. Trease filed a Response to Notice of Violations and Order 
(sometimes referred to hereinafter as "the Response") with the Board. 
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8. On April 21, 1995, the Executive Secretary (UST) sent a letter to Heinz Mahler, counsel 
for Mr. Trease, which stated that because the Response was not timely filed and the 
appropriate steps regarding filing a motion to set aside the February 6, 1995 Order under 
2 Utah Admin. Code R31 l-210-3(e) (April 1, 1995) had not been followed, the Response 
could not be considered a request for agency action to contest the February 6, 1995 Order 
before the Board. The Executive Secretary (UST) indicated that, pursuant to 2 Utah 
Admin. Code R31 l-210-3(e) (April 1, 1995), any subsequent motion filed to set aside the 
February 6, 1995 Order had to be based upon the standards for having a default order set 
aside under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP). 
9. On May 10, 1995, Mr. Trease filed a Motion to Set Aside Order with the Executive 
Secretary (UST) pursuant to 2 Utah Admin. R311-210-3(e) (April 1, 1995). The Motion 
was accompanied by a Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion to Set Aside 
Order. The Motion requested that the February 6, 1995 Order be set aside based on Rule 
60(b)(1) ("mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect") and Rule 60(b)(7) ("any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment") of the URCP and that 
the Executive Secretary (UST) consider the merits of the Response. 
10. Under 2 Utah Admin. R311-210-3(d) (April 1, 1995), Mr. Trease has the burden of 
proving that the February 6, 1995 Order was, in fact, contested within thirty (30) days of 
its issuance. 
ARGUMENT 
L T H E FAILURE OF MR. TREASE TO TIMELY CONTEST THE FEBRUARY 6,1995 ORDER 
WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS WAS NOT DUE TO MISTAKE, INADVERTENCE, SURPRISE, OR 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT UNDER RULE 60(B)(1). 
Mr. Trease first contends that his failure to timely contest the February 6, 1995 Order was 
due to his "mistaken impression that meetings with Bill Moore on March 22, 1995, would toll 
any relevant time period requiring a written response." Memorandum of Authorities, p. 3. Mr. 
Trease asserts that this "reasonable, although mistaken assumption" rises to the level of mistake, 
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inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect sufficient to have the final February 6, 1995 Order 
set aside under Rule 60(b)(1). Id. However, Mr. Trease provides no legal precedent supporting 
his request under Rule 60(b)(1) and provides no legal basis whatsoever for granting such relief 
under Rule 60(b)(7). 
With respect to Mr. Trease's request for relief under Rule 60(b)(7), the courts have held 
that "subsection (7) 'should be very cautiously and sparingly invoked by the Court only in 
unusual and exceptional circumstances/" Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.. 817 P.2d 382 
(Utah App. 1991) (citing Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Association. 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-7 
(Utah 1982)). This judicial precaution, together with the fact that Mr. Trease does not reference 
Rule 60(b)(7) in the Memorandum of Authorities, is persuasive cause for finding that Mr. 
Trease's argument regarding his mistaken impression should be addressed solely by reference to 
Rule 60(b)(1). 
Rule 60(b)(1) provides that f,[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in furtherance of justice relieve a party or his [or her] legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect;..." (emphasis added). It is generally accepted by the courts that the term "excusable 
neglect" acts as a catch-all for all of the terms listed under Rule 60(b)(1). See Valley Leasing 
v. Houghton. 661 P.2d 959,960 (Utah 1983). Accordingly, the courts have sought only to define 
the term "excusable neglect" when reviewing motions under Rule 60(b)(1). 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined "excusable neglect" as "the exercise of due diligence 
by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances.'' Mini Spas. Inc. v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah. 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). In Mini Spas, the 
defaulting party contended that its untimely response was due to a notice being inadvertently 
stuck together in a desk drawer. Id. The Utah Supreme Court, in holding that the alleged 
neglect or mistake was not excusable, stated that "...the undisputed facts here do not support any 
claim that the [defaulting party] diligently acted in a reasonably prudent manner in failing to file 
its response until three weeks after it was due." Id. Although distinguishable in its facts, Mini 
Spas provides a touchstone for measuring the reasonableness of Mr. Trease's actions in this case. 
Mr. Trease asserts that it was his understanding that contacting Bill Moore and scheduling 
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an appointment satisfied the requirements for contesting the February 6,1995 Order, citing the 
instruction on the cover letter to contact Bill Moore "[i]f you have any questions regarding this 
matter...." Memorandum of Authorities, p. 2. Based on this instruction, Mr. Trease contends that 
it was his "reasonable, although mistaken assumption, that his contacts and scheduled meetings 
with William Moore would satisfy the requirements to respond to the Notice of Violations and 
Order and would toll any relevant time period." Id. at 3. For the reasons set forth below, this 
assertion does not rise to the level of "excusable neglect" sufficient to have the February 6, 1995 
Order set aside under Rule 60(b)(1). 
First, the assertion that contacting Bill Moore "would satisfy the requirements to respond 
to the Notice of Violations and Order and would toll any relevant time period" implies that Mr. 
Trease was, in fact, aware of the deadline for contesting the February 6, 1995 Order. The only 
way Mr. Trease could have known this fact was to have read the pertinent provisions in the 
February 6, 1995 Order concerning filing a request for agency action. Second, the instructions 
for contesting the February 6, 1995 Order were clear, simple, and unambiguous. In contrast to 
these very specific and clear instructions for contesting the February 6, 1995 Order, the 
instruction on the cover letter was a very general statement which simply provided Mr. Trease 
a contact person at the DERR in the event he had questions regarding the February 6, 1995 Order 
itself. Third, it is not clear whether Mr. Trease even contacted Bill Moore to schedule a meeting 
prior to the expiration of the thirty (30) day period on March 6, 1995. The only fact set forth 
by Mr. Trease is that at some point after the issuance of the February 6, 1995 Order, Mr. Trease 
contacted Bill Moore and scheduled a meeting for March 10, 1995 which was subsequently 
rescheduled for March 22, 1995 at the request of Mr. Trease. Certainly, if Mr. Trease did not 
even contact Bill Moore prior to the thirty (30) day deadline on March 6, 1996, his "reasonable, 
although mistaken assumption" would not be excusable. Fourth, and probably most important, 
assuming that Mr. Trease did contact Bill Moore within the thirty (30) day period, Mr. Trease 
then failed to even mention the February 6, 1995 Order at the March 22, 1995 meeting or imply 
in any way that the meeting was meant to contest the February 6, 1995 Order. This fact 
diminishes the veracity of Mr. Trease's assertion that he was operating under a "reasonable, 
although mistaken assumption." 
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL CANNOT PROPERLY BE ASSERTED AGAINST THE 
DERR IN THIS CASE AND, AS A RESULT, DOES NOT SATISFY UTAH'S MERITORIOUS 
DEFENSE REQUIREMENT FOR SETTING ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 
60(B)(1). 
In addition to showing that the February 6, 1995 Order resulted from mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, Mr. Trease must also satisfy the requirements of 
Utah's meritorious defense rule to be relieved from the February 6, 1995 Order under Rule 
60(b)(1). See Downey State Bank v. Maior-Blakenev Corp.. 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976). This 
rule requires Mr. Trease to "proffer some defense of at least sufficient ostensible merit as would 
justify a trial of the issue thus raised." Id. at 510; see also Richins. 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah 
App. 1991) (requiring "that there exist issues worthy of adjudication"). In Erickson v. Schenkers 
International Forwarders. Inc., the Utah Supreme Court held that "[generally, courts should be 
liberal in granting relief against default judgments so that cases may be tried on the merits. 
However, that policy must be weighed against the purpose of the meritorious defense rule, which 
is to 'prevent the necessity of judicial review of questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are 
frivolousr 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994) {quoting State Bv & Through Utah Dept. of Social 
Services v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1983) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added). 
As shown below, Mr. Trease's defense invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel is facially 
frivolous in this case and, therefore, does not satisfy the requirements of Utah's meritorious 
defense rule for setting aside the February 6, 1995 Order under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Mr. Trease contends that alleged statements by a DERR employee now bar the DERR 
from enforcing the February 6,1995 Order under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Specifically, 
Mr. Trease asserts that he "reasonably relied on the statements on the part of Shelly Quick [a 
scientist in the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Section of the DERR] in continuing 
[to make] gasoline and fuel deliveries to the Hooper Country Store...even though no Certificate 
of Compliance had been issued." Memorandum of Authorities, p. 6. As a result, Mr. Trease 
concludes that "[p]rinciples of equitable estoppel now bar the State of Utah from issuing fines 
pursuant to the Order of February 6, 1995." Id. at 8. This argument fails for the following 
reasons. 
First, a letter from the Executive Secretary (UST) to Mr. Trease dated June 2, 1993 
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specifically states that M[t]his facility does not have a Certificate of Compliance and should not 
be receiving fuel." (emphasis added). Clearly, Mr. Trease was on formal notice from the 
Executive Secretary (UST) that petroleum deliveries should not be made to the Facility until a 
Certificate of Compliance was issued by the DERR. 
Second, Shelly Quick never gave Mr. Trease permission to continue making petroleum 
deliveries to the Facility while the Facility was without a Certificate of Compliance. At the time 
of the alleged conversations with Mr. Trease, Ms. Quick knew that the requirement to obtain a 
Certificate of Compliance was mandated by law and was aware that persons making such 
deliveries were subject to statutory penalties. See Shelly Quick Affidavit, paragraph 11. In 
response to Mr. Treasefs questions whether he should discontinue making petroleum deliveries 
by closing the Facility, Ms. Quick in each instance indicated that she did not want the Facility 
closed but, rather, wanted Mr. Trease to comply with the requirements for obtaining a Certificate 
of Compliance. Id. at paragraphs 10 and 12. At no time did Ms. Quick give Mr. Trease 
permission to make petroleum deliveries to the Facility without first obtaining a Certificate of 
Compliance or indicate that applicable statutory penalties would not be assessed by the DERR. 
Id. at paragraph 11. In fact, Mr. Trease was fully aware that such penalties could be imposed 
based on the assessment of penalties for identical violations at other facilities owned and/or 
operated by Mr. Trease. See Dan Trease Deposition, p. 50 (Michael and Alison Jones v. Dan 
Trease d/b/a Dan Trease Distributing, 2nd Dst Crt., Civil No. 930900372 PI) (January 13 and 14, 
1994). With respect to the Facility, Mr. Trease specifically told Shelly Quick that he believed 
the DERR would impose penalties if he supplied the DERR with the requested information. See 
Shelly Quick Affidavit, paragraph 11. 
Third, assuming that Shelly Quick so advised Mr. Trease, her statements do not bind the 
DERR in this instance. See Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991). In Prows, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that, with respect to estoppel claims against the state for activities "which 
are strictly prohibited by statute..At is quite universally held that no estoppel will lie against the 
government...." Id. at 769 (emphasis added). Because the alleged statements of the agency or 
its employees would, if taken as true, be in direct violation of the statute, the court held in Prows 
that the plaintiffs claim did not come within the "exception to the rule that promissory estoppel 
may not be applied against the government." Id. In this case, Mr. Trease was fully aware that 
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petroleum deliveries should not be made to the Facility based on the plain language of the June 
2, 1993 letter from the Executive Secretary (UST). Moreover, Mr. Trease is, and was, aware that 
penalties could be imposed by the DERR for making petroleum deliveries to any facility not 
having a Certificate of Compliance in violation of Utah Code Unann. § 19-6-416 (1995). See 
Dan Trease Deposition, p. 50 (Michael and Alison Jones v. Dan Trease d/b/a Dan Trease 
Distributing. 2nd Dst Crt., Civil No. 930900372 PI) (January 13 and 14, 1994). 
Fourth, Mr. Trease's assertion of equitable estoppel in this case fails as a matter of law. 
The elements necessary to invoke equitable estoppel are: 
(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim 
afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of 
such admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party 
resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate 
such admission, statement, or act. 
Consolidation Coal v. Div. of State Lands. 886 P.2d 514, 522 (Utah 1994) (quoting 
Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission. 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979)). 
Because this argument fails as a matter of law, there is no basis for discussing these elements. 
However, to the extent facts have been set forth verifying that the alleged statements made by 
Shelly Quick are incorrect, there is no basis for finding that the first element has been 
established. 
Generally, estoppel cannot be asserted against a governmental entity. See Utah State 
Univ. v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). However, estoppel may lie against the 
government when, in addition to the traditional estoppel requirements outlined above, "injustice 
would result and there would be no substantial adverse effect on public policy." Consolidation 
Coal. 886 P.2d at 522 (quoting Celebrity Club. 602 P.2d at 694). Stated another way, "it is well 
settled that equitable estoppel is only assertable against the State or its institutions in unusual 
situations in which it is plainly apparent that failing to apply the rule would result in manifest 
injustice:' Orton v. Utah State Tax Commission Collection Div.. 864 P.2d 904, 909 (Utah 
App.1993) (quoting Holland v. Career Service Review Board. 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah 
App.1993)) (emphasis added). "In such cases, 'the critical inquiry is whether it appears that the 
facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of such gravity, to 
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invoke the exception." Holland. 856 P.2d at 682 (quoting Utah State Univ. v. Sutro. 646 P.2d 
at 720). Moreover, "as a prerequisite to a finding of injustice, the party asserting estoppel must 
show that it acted with 'reasonable prudence and diligence' in relying on the State's 
representations." Consolidation Coal. 886 P.2d at 522 (citing Morgan v. Board of State Lands. 
549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976)). Finally, it is important to note that "[t]he few cases in which 
Utah courts have permitted estoppel against the government have involved very specific written 
representations by authorized government entities." Holland. 856 P.2d at 682 (quoting Anderson 
v. Public Service Commission. 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)) (emphasis added). 
Given the case law addressing this issue, Mr. Trease did not act with the level of 
"reasonable prudence and diligence" required for equitable estoppel to be successfully asserted 
against the DERR. First, Mr. Trease's claim is based solely on several alleged verbal 
conversations with Shelly Quick, not on any written representations from the DERR as required 
by Holland and Anderson. In fact, the only written information received by Mr. Trease 
specifically stated that he should not be delivering petroleum to the Facility while it was without 
a Certificate of Compliance. Moreover, because there are no written statements from the DERR 
which would confirm the alleged conversations with Shelly Quick but only disputed verbal 
conversations, the allegations do not rise to the level of certainty required by Utah State Univ. 
v. Sutro. See also Anderson. 839 P.2d at 827-28. 
Second, "after withholding information, [Mr. Trease] is not entitled to claim protection 
under the estoppel doctrine." Consolidation Coal. 886 P.2d at 523 (citing Morgan. 549 P.2d at 
697 n. 4 ("The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not operate in favor of one who has 
knowledge of the essential facts or who has convenient and available means of obtaining such 
knowledge.")). By withholding information which was essential for the issuance of the 
Certificate of Compliance, Mr. Trease cannot now claim the protection afforded by the estoppel 
doctrine. 
Third, "[Mr. Trease's] claims of reasonable prudence and due diligence are particularly 
tenuous given that [Mr. Trease] continued to [make fuel deliveries]...even after receiving notice 
from the State [that such deliveries should not be made without a Certificate of Compliance]." 
Consolidation Coal. 886 P.2d at 523 (original emphasis). 
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"In sum, '[e]stoppel is a doctrine of equity purposed to rescue from loss a party who has, 
without fault, been deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of another.'" Id. 
(quoting Morgan. 549 P.2d at 697) (emphasis added). Mr. Trease withheld information essential 
to issuing a Certificate of Compliance for the Facility. Mr. Trease was not misinformed by the 
DERR or any of its employees at any time. Based on the foregoing, Mr. Trease's actions were 
not reasonably prudent and not the result of due diligence sufficient to successfully assert 
equitable estoppel against the DERR. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Trease has not met the burden of proof required under 2 Utah 
Admin. Code R311-210-3(d) (April 1, 1995) for proving that he, in fact, contested the February 
6, 1995 Order within thirty (30) days. Mr. Trease has not provided sufficient facts or legal 
precedent upon which granting the Motion under Rule 60(b)(1) would either be just or in 
furtherance of justice. In light of the definition of "excusable neglect" enunciated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Mini Spas and Mr. Trease's failure to set forth a meritorious defense, Mr. 
Trease's proffered excuse for not timely responding to the February 6, 1995 Order is not 
reasonable nor the result of due diligence sufficient to set aside the February 6, 1995 Order under 
Rule 60(b)(1). As a result, the DERR may enforce the February 6, 1995 Order, including the 
collection of the $29,500 for fifty-nine (59) separate violations of Utah Code Unann. § 19-6-416 
(1995) and any penalties deemed proper by the district court under Utah Code Unann. § 19-6-
425(1) (1995). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A decision to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion should not be reversed absent an abuse 
of discretion. See Fackrell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Utah 1987); Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 
709 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1985); Larsen v. Collins. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984); Birch v. Birch. 771 
P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989); Baker v. Western Surety Co.. 757 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 1988). In 
Pacer Sport and Cycle. Inc. v. Myers, the Utah Supreme Court held that a court "should not 
reverse [a decision granting or denying a Rule 60(b) motion] except for abuse of discretion, to 
wit, that it is arbitrary, capricious, or not based on adequate findings of fact or on the law" 534 
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P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1975) (emphasis added). Based on the foregoing, this Order Denying 
Motion to Set Aside Order is not arbitrary and capricious and is based on adequate findings of 
fact and applicable legal precedent. 
APPEALING THIS ORDER 
As provided by 2 Utah Admin. Code R311-210-3(e)(2) (April 1, 1995), you may seek 
reconsideration or agency review of only my decision to deny the Motion. Under Utah Code 
Unann. § 19-6-404(3) (1995), "appeals of decisions made by the executive secretary under this 
part shall be made to the [Board]." As a result, to appeal this Order Denying Motion to Set 
Aside Order, you must file a request for reconsideration or agency review with the Utah Solid 
and Hazardous Waste Control Board located at 168 North 1950 West, First Floor, P.O. Box 
144840, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4840 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order 
Denying Motion to Set Aside Order is mailed. You must also provide a copy of your request 
for reconsideration or agency review to the Executive Secretary (UST), Kent P. Gray, at the same 
address. 
If you fail to appeal this Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Order as described herein, 
you will have no other legal basis for opposing the February 6, 1995 Order which will remain 
final. In such a case, and in the event you refuse to otherwise comply with the February 6,1995 
Order, including payment of $29,500 for fifty-nine (59) separate violations of Utah Code Unann. 
§ 19-6-416 (1995), I will refer the matter to the Utah Attorney General's Office for institution 
of enforcement proceedings in district court as prescribed by Utah Code Unann. § 19-6-425(2) 
(1995). This would include enforcement of the $29,500 penalty referenced above as well as the 
maximum amount of civil penalties allowed by law under Utah Code Unann. § 19-6-425(1) 
(1995). 
Dated this c*ft day of November, 1995. 
Kent P. Gray, Executive Secretary (UST) 
Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing by regular 
mail on this 20 of November, 1995 to the following: 
Dan Trease 
5600 South 5900 West 
Hooper, UT 84315 
(Mux Uwto 
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THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (UST) OF THE 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
In the Matter of: 
Affidavit of William (Bill) Moore 
DAN TREASE 
5600 South 5900 West 
Hooper, UT 84315 : FACILITY NO. 1200241 
The undersigned, William (Bill) Moore, being duly sworn under oath, deposes and states 
as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit. 
2. I have been employed by the Utah Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), Division 
of Environmental Response and Remediation (DERR), as a scientist in the Underground 
Storage Tank (UST) Program since December of 1987. 
3. As a scientist in the UST Program, I work with regulated underground storage tank (UST) 
owners and/or operators in assuring that all applicable laws and regulations governing the 
use of USTs are observed, including the requirement to have a Certificate of Compliance. 
4. I was assigned the above-referenced facility ("Facility") in October of 1993 after the 
previous UST site manager, James Thiros, transferred to another section within the DERR. 
5. On a number of occasions, I have personally met with, spoken to, or otherwise 
communicated with, Dan Trease ("Mr. Trease") regarding compliance violations at the 
Facility as well as at other facilities owned by Mr. Trease. 
6. In response to these discussions regarding compliance violations, Mr. Trease has asked 
me several times whether he should close his facilities. 
7. On each occasion, I told Mr. Trease that the DERR wants Mr. Trease to bring each of his 
facilities into compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, including the 
requirement to have a Certificate of Compliance. 
8. In so instructing Mr. Trease regarding the need for a Certificate of Compliance, I 
specifically indicated that the petroleum inventory records for the Facility had to be 
submitted to the DERR and the extent of the petroleum contamination had to be proeprly 
defined and characterized before a Certificate of Compliance could be issued. 
9. During these conversations, I specifically told Mr. Trease that a penalty of $500 per 
delivery may be imposed by the DERR for receiving fuel without a Certificate of 
Compliance. 
10. Although having promised to be responsive and forthcoming in bringing the Facility into 
compliance on numerous occasions, Mr. Trease failed to do so for over three (3) years. 
11. After making several requests over a two (2) year period, I received the petroleum 
inventory records for the Facility on August 31, 1994. 
12. By September 1, 1994, Shelly Quick, the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) 
manager assigned to the Facility, advised me that Mr. Trease had properly defined and 
characterized the extent of the petroleum contamination at the Facility in accordance with 
federal regulations. 
13. After receiving documentation by fax on September 5, 1994 regarding overfill protection 
and inventory reconciliation, a Certificate of Compliance was issued by the DERR on 
September 6, 1994. 
14. Sometime after the February 6,1995 Notice of Violation and Order ("Notice") was issued, 
Mr. Trease called me to schedule a meeting to discuss the compliance violations at the 
Facility as well as at the other facilities owned by Mr. Trease. A meeting was scheduled 
for March 10, 1995. 
15. At Mr. Trease's request, the March 10,1995 meeting was rescheduled for March 22,1995. 
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16. At the March 22, 1995 meeting, Mr. Trease and I discussed the compliance violations at 
each facility owned or operated by Mr. Trease, including the Facility. 
17. At no time during the March 22, 1995 meeting did Mr. Trease mention the Notice or 
indicate, either directly or indirectly, that the meeting was meant to contest the Notice. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this 7 ^ day of November, 1995. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
WILLIAM MOORE, being duly sworn, affirms that the facts set forth in the foregoing 
Affidavit are true, accurate, and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
William (Bill) Moore 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this j 7 ^ day of November, 1995. 
Notary public 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Mary Charlent Lamph 
1*8 North 1050 Wttt 
S*!t Ukt City. UUh 6411$ 
My Commlttlon Expki* 
8«pt#mt»f9.199* 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (UST) OF THE 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
In the Matter of: : 
Affidavit of Shelly Quick 
DAN TREASE : 
5600 South 5900 West 
Hooper, UT 84315 : FACILITY NO. 1200241 
The undersigned, Shelly Quick, being duly sworn under oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit unless otherwise stated. 
2. I have been employed by the Utah Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), Division 
of Environmental Response and Remediation (DERR), as a scientist in the Leaking 
Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Program since August of 1989. 
3. As a scientist in the LUST Program, I facilitate the process wherein petroleum 
contamination from underground storage tanks is characterized and then remediated. As 
such, I am not usually involved with the issuance of Certificates of Compliance, a 
responsibility of the Underground Storage Tank (UST) Program. However, in those 
instances where a petroleum release has occurred, the DERR has traditionally required the 
owner and/or operator to at least characterize the degree of the contamination before a 
Certificate of Compliance is issued. Thus, my involvement with issuing a Certificate of 
Compliance for the above-referenced facility ("Facility") has only been to assure that the 
petroleum contamination at the Facility has been properly defined and characterized. 
4. The statements in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 are based on my review of the Facility file. 
5. The Facility was assigned to the LUST Program after gasoline fumes were reported by 
an employee of the Hooper Water Department in March of 1988. 
In response to the March, 1988 report, an on-site inspection was conducted on April 1, 
1988 by Alex Pashley of the Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste. Mr. Pashley 
detected petroleum vapors in the water meter box located at the Facility. 
I was assigned the Facility in June of 1991. 
In March of 1992,1 disapproved an application for a Certificate of Compliance submitted 
by Dan Trease ("Mr. Trease") because he had failed to properly define and characterize 
the extent of the petroleum contamination at the Facility in accordance with federal 
regulations. 
On May 6, 1992,1 met with Mr. Trease and Wayne Wilson, the Facility's convenience 
store manager, at the DERR. During the meeting, Mr. Trease provided me with verbal 
inventory numbers which indicated that the Facility had experienced a loss of petroleum 
for 1991. However, Mr. Trease did not provide copies of any petroleum inventory records 
at that time. 
At the May 6, 1992 meeting, I specifically recall Mr. Trease asking me whether he should 
close the Facility. In response, I specifically remember telling Mr. Trease that the 
DERR did not want the Facility closed but wanted Mr. Trease to properly define and 
characterize the extent of the petroleum contamination in accordance with federal 
regulations. Typically, the DERR does not require a facility to close for failing to 
properly define and characterize the extent of petroleum contamination. 
On March 22, 1994,1 met with Mr. Trease at the offices of Dan Trease Distributing, a 
petroleum-distributing business located in Hooper, Utah. At that meeting, Mr. Trease 
produced computer-generated petroleum inventory records that appeared to encompass 
several years, though the exact years were not indicated on the records. I asked Mr. 
Trease for a copy of these petroleum inventory records knowing that the DERR needed 
these records to issue a Certificate of Compliance for the Facility. Mr. Trease refused, 
stating his belief that the DERR would use the petroleum inventory records as a basis for 
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imposing penalties for illegal deliveries. I agreed with Mr. Trease that the DERR could 
impose penalties for illegal deliveries based on the petroleum inventory records. However, 
I explained to Mr. Trease that the only way to avoid having the penalties accrue was to 
obtain a Certificate of Compliance for the Facility by submitting the petroleum inventory 
records as soon as possible and demonstrating that the petroleum contamination had been 
properly defined and characterized in accordance with federal regulations. 
12. At the March 22, 1994 meeting, I specifically recall Mr. Trease asking me whether he 
should close the Facility. In response, I specifically remember telling Mr. Trease that the 
DERR did not want the Facility closed but wanted Mr. Trease to come into compliance 
by submitting the petroleum inventory records and properly defining the extent of the 
petroleum contamination. 
13. Mrs. Trease was present for all or most of the March 22, 1994 meeting. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this _j?L day of A > T i 2 ^ ^ ± > 1995. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SHELLY QUICK, being duly sworn, affirms that the facts set forth in the foregoing 
Affidavit are true, accurate, and complete to the best of her knowledge and belief. 
ixUM^ (Dux, ^_ 
Shelly Quick v i 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this $_ day of November, 1995. 
1ff\hh^fhpA)pu>rfUu/W J 
Notary PiSblic ' ' 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Mary Chartana Lamph 
_ 168 North 1050 Watt 
84ttUk.Ctty.UUh M l l f 
My CommtMton ExpttM 
fepMmbwt.lM* 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADDENDUM 7 
HEINZ J. MAHLER - #3832 
KIRK G. GIBBS - #5955 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Dan Trease 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone (801) 521-3773 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
In the Matter of: 
Dan Trease 
5600 South 5900 West 
Hooper, Utah 84315 
MOTION FOR AGENCY REVIEW 
OF ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE NOTICE AND ORDER 
RE: Facility ID No. 1200241 
Dan Trease, by and through counsel, and pursuant to 2 Utah Admin. Code R. 
31 l-210-3(e)(2) and Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-404(3), moves the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Control Board for review of the Executive Secretary's Order dated November 20, 1995 denying 
Dan Trease's Motion to Set Aside Order which became final on March 6, 1995. This motion 
is supported by the accompanying Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion for Agency 
Review of Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Order. 
DATED this l5day of December, 1995. 
RISTIAN, P.C. 
AttomeysNfor Dan Trease 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, postage prepaid, this of December, 1995, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion for Agency Review of Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Notice 
and Order, to the following: 
Kent P. Gray 
Executive Secretary (UST) 
Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Control Board 
168 North 1950 West 
First Floor 
P.O. Box 144840 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4840 
"fonfLO-J 
HEINZ J. MAHLER - #3832 
KIRK G. GIBBS - #5955 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Dan Trease 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone (801) 521-3773 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
In the Matter of: MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF ORDER Dan Trease 
5600 South 5900 West DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER 
Hooper, Utah 84315 : 
: RE: Facility ID No. 1200241 
Dan Trease, by and through counsel, submits this Memorandum of Authorities 
in Support of his Motion for Agency Review of Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Order dated 
November 20, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On February 6,1995, Kent P. Gray, Executive Secretary ("UST"), Utah Solid 
& Hazardous Waste Control Board, issued a Notice of Violations and Order ("Notice and 
Order") regarding the site located at the Hooper Country Store, Hooper, Utah. This Notice and 
Order was sent directly to Trease with not even a copy provided to his counsel as required by 
R311-2102(0-
2. Pursuant to the instructions contained in the Notice and Order and the 
accompanying correspondence, Trease contacted William Moore of the DERR to schedule a 
meeting to discuss the claims and fines contained in the Notice and Order. This meeting was 
originally scheduled for March 10, 1995. Because of scheduling conflicts, the meeting was held 
March 22, 1995 at the offices of the DEQ/DERR. (Affidavit of Dan Trease, 11 14-16.) 
3. At this meeting, Mr. Moore requested additional information regarding the 
Hooper Country Store site and another meeting between he and Mr. Trease was to be scheduled 
in the near future. 
4. During this time, Mr. Trease had not yet consulted his counsel on this matter 
and believed that his contacting Mr. Moore after receiving the Notice and Order and the 
subsequent meeting between he and Mr. Moore constituted compliance with his requirement to 
respond to the Notice and Order within 30 days. Mr. Trease also was under the impression that 
if he and Mr. Moore were unsuccessful in resolving the issues addressed in the Notice and 
Order, Mr. Trease would have an opportunity to meet with his attorney and to file a written 
response to the Notice and Order. (Affidavit of Dan Trease, 11 15 and 19.) 
5. After his initial meeting with Mr. Moore, Mr. Trease notified his attorney for 
the first time regarding the Notice and Order and was informed at that time that a written 
response would be necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Trease's attorney filed a written response to 
the Notice and Order on April 4, 1995. (Affidavit of Dan Trease, 11 17 and 18.) 
2 
6. Trease was informed by way of a letter to his counsel dated April 21, 1995 
that the response to the Notice and Order was untimely and consequently the February 6, 1995 
Notice and Order had become final on March 6, 1995. 
7. On May 10, 1995, Trease filed a Motion to Set Aside Order with the 
Executive Secretary (UST). The motion was accompanied by a Memorandum of Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Set Aside Order. The motion requested that the February 6, 1995 Order 
be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure based upon mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. 
8. On November 20, 1995, the Executive Secretary (UST) entered an Order 
denying Trease's Motion to Set Aside Order. 
9. The Notice and Order assessed a penalty against Trease of $29,500.00 for 59 
deliveries of petroleum to underground storage tanks located at the Hooper facility which were 
not covered by a Certificate of Compliance at the time of the deliveries. 
10. In 1991, when the requirement for a Certificate of Compliance came into 
effect, Trease submitted an appropriate application to receive a Certificate of Compliance in 
connection with the Hooper Country Store. During this same time frame, a dispute arose 
between Trease and the Jones family, who lived west of the Hooper Country Store. The Jones 
family claimed that gasoline from overfills of the underground storage tanks contaminated their 
property. The Joneses subsequently filed a lawsuit against Trease in connection with these 
claims. (Affidavit of Dan Trease, ft 4 and 5.) 
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11. Between 1991 and 1994 Trease had many discussions with Shelley Quick of 
the DEQ/DERR regarding the Certificate of Compliance and the Joneses' claims. It was 
Trease's understanding through these discussions with Ms. Quick that his Certificate of 
Compliance was being withheld as a result of the Joneses' claims. Trease expected that once 
the Jones lawsuit had been resolved he would be issued a Certificate of Compliance. (Affidavit 
of Trease H 6-8.) Trease had complied with all requirements of R311-206-2(b), nevertheless, 
the DERR continually and wrongfully refused to issue a Certificate of Compliance, presumably 
due to the dispute with the Joneses. 
12. On several occasions during the initial cleanup efforts at the site connected 
with the Joneses' claims, Trease asked Ms. Quick whether he should stop delivering gasoline 
to the Hooper Country Store due to the fact that no Certificate of Compliance had been issued. 
Each time Trease asked this question, he understood Ms. Quick to say "no" and that 
DEQ/DERR was not demanding that gasoline deliveries cease. (Affidavit of Dan Trease, 118-
10.) 
13. Reasonably relying upon Ms. Quick's statements, Trease continued to deliver 
gasoline to the Hooper Country Store. It was Mr. Trease's understanding, based upon his 
conversations with Ms. Quick that despite the lack of a Certificate of Compliance, a fact which 
Ms. Quick and the DEQ/DERR were aware of. he would not be penalized for gasoline deliveries 
to the Hooper Country Store. (Affidavit of Dan Trease, 11 10-13.) 
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14. Wayne Wilson and Nedra Trease have submitted affidavits stating under oath 
that they remember being present during discussions between Ms. Quick and Trease wherein 
Trease asked Quick if he should stop making gasoline deliveries to the Hooper Country Store 
because of a lack of Certificate of Compliance. Both Mr. Wilson and Ms. Trease recall Ms. 
Quick responding "no" and then stating something to the effect that "we" don't want to shut you 
down. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (UST) ABUSED HIS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE NOTICE AND ORDER 
TO ALLOW TREASE TO CONTEST IT BEFORE THE UTAH 
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
The standard applied when setting aside an initial Order of the Executive Secretary 
is that standard contained in Utah R. Civ. P. 60. 2 Utah Admin. Code R. 311-210-3(e). 
Rule 60 reads in relevant part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect^ . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) 
The Executive Secretary ignored the clear language and purpose of Rule 60 and 
abused his discretion in refusing to set aside the Notice and Order in this case. 
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First, Rule 60 unambiguously provides relief from mistake, inadvertence or 
excusable neglect. Trease's conduct in this case is at worst a reasonable mistake and he should 
be allowed to have this case decided on the merits. Trease did not neglect the Notice and Order 
or even inadvertently fail to respond to it. Rather once he received the Notice and Order he 
contacted William Moore, just as the Notice and Order stated, to set up a meeting. Trease at 
this point was under the mistaken impression that because he contacted Moore and scheduled a 
meeting for March 22, 1995, a written response to the Notice and Order was not required within 
30 days. Because of this mistake, Trease did not inform his counsel of receipt of the Notice and 
Order until after the 30 day period to respond had passed. It was at that time that Trease first 
learned of his mistake that the Board still required a written response to the Notice and Order 
within 30 days notwithstanding his contacting and meeting with William Moore. 
Trease is not an attorney and did not have the advice of an attorney until after the 
30 day period for filing a response to the Notice and Order had passed. It is not unreasonable 
for a non-attorney to assume that because he contacted a representative of the DEQ/DERR and 
scheduled a meeting after receiving the Notice and Order he would not be defaulted for not fding 
a written response within 30 days. It is this type of mistake and inadvertence for not contacting 
counsel sooner from which Rule 60 provides relief. 
Second, the purpose of Rule 60 is to further justice by allowing a party who has 
made a mistake to have his case decided on the merits rather than by default. In this case 
Trease has been ordered to pay $29,500.00 in penalties without having the merits of the case 
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considered. Under the circumstances surrounding Trease's failure to file a written response to 
the Notice and Order within 30 days, justice will only be furthered if the Order is set aside to 
allow this case to be decided on the merits. 
Finally, contrary to the Executive Secretary's argument, the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel constitutes a "meritorious defense" to the Board's action. The Executive Secretary sites 
to testimony and makes argument to the effect that the facts in this case do not entitle Trease to 
a defense under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. However, a party must not prove 
conclusively a defense to a claim in a Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside an Order. Rather, in the 
context of a Rule 60 motion, a meritorious defense is merely one which sets forth specific and 
sufficiently detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from 
the one entered. State ex. rel. Utah State Depart of Social Serv. v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1983); see also Downev State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp.. 545 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 
1976) (the meritorious defense rule only requires Trease to "proffer some defense of at least 
sufficient ostensible merit as would justify a trial of the issue thus raised.") As set forth below, 
Trease has certainly presented specific and sufficiently detailed facts which, if proven, would 
require a result different from the assessment of $29,500.00 in penalties. 
The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) admission, statement, or act 
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such 
admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first 
party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or fact. Celebrity Pub. Inc. v. Utah 
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Liquor Control Commission. 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). It is well settled that when 
injustice would result if the government is not estopped and where there would be no substantial 
adverse effect on public policy, equitable estoppel may lie against the government. Consolidated 
Coal v. Div. of State Lands. 886 P.2d 514 (Utah 1994). 
In this case Trease asked specifically on several occasions whether he should stop 
delivering gasoline to the Hooper Country Store due to the fact that for a time, the Certificate 
of Compliance had been revoked. Shelley Quick of the DEQ/DERR said no. (Affidavit of 
Dan Trease, ^ 8 and 9.) Both Wayne Wilson and Nedra Trease submitted affidavits stating 
they specifically recollect Shelley Quick answering "no" to Trease's inquiry as to whether he 
should stop making gasoline and fuel deliveries to the Hooper Country Store. 
Reasonably relying upon Ms. Quick statements, Trease continued to deliver 
petroleum to the tanks at the Hooper Country Store with the understanding that the issue of the 
Certificate of Compliance would be resolved after the Jones lawsuit had been settled or gone to 
judgment. In fact, shortly after the Jones' lawsuit was settled, the State of Utah re-issued the 
Certificate of Compliance as to the Hooper Country Store. 
Notwithstanding Ms. Quick's statements and representations to Trease regarding 
petroleum deliveries to the Hooper Country Store, DEQ/DERR is now assessing penalties for 
the very deliveries which Ms. Quick said did not have to cease. The DEQ/DERR has always 
been aware of the petroleum deliveries to the Hooper Country Store despite the lack of a 
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Certificate of Compliance. Had Trease been aware that he would be fined for such deliveries, 
he would have never made them. 
As a result of Trease's reasonable reliance upon the statements from 
DEQ/DERR's representative, he will be damaged in the amount of $29,500.00 in penalties. If 
the DEQ/DERR is not estopped from assessing these penalties, a tremendous injustice would 
result to Mr. Trease. 
Conversely, applying equitable estoppel to the DEQ/DERR in this case would not 
result in a substantial adverse effect on public policy. Whether or not the penalties are now 
assessed cannot change the fact that the deliveries were made notwithstanding the temporary lack 
of a Certificate of Compliance. Statutory penalties are to be a deterrent to the operation of 
facilities not in compliance with regulatory law by preventing deliveries to such facilities. 
During the time that the Certificate of Compliance was revoked, Trease was working with the 
DERR in trying to satisfy state demands regarding that site and at the same time, was involved 
in litigation regarding responsibility for confirmation at that site. Nor will any future deterrent 
effect of the penalties be lost if equitable estoppel is applied because had Ms. Quick not made 
the representations she made, Trease would have ceased making deliveries to the Hooper 
Country Store until a Certificate of Compliance had been issued. The Order regarding punitive 
penalties now that threaten to put Trease out of business is a matter deserving review. 
The affidavits submitted by Trease and the argument raised herein establish that 
Trease has a meritorious defense to the DEQ/DERR's Notice and Order and should be allowed 
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to have this case decided on the merits rather than by default. Under the circumstances set forth 
above, regarding Trease's reasonable reliance on DERR actions and representations, and the fact 
that pursuant to R311-206-2(b), the Certificate of Compliance was wrongfully withheld in the 
first place, the Executive Secretary abused his discretion in denying Trease's Motion to Set 
Aside Order. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Trease respectfully requests that the Board reverse the 
Order of the Executive Secretary (UST) and set aside the Notice and Order dated February 6, 
1995. 
DATED this Ipday of December, 1995. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, postage prepaid, this j^flay of December, 1995, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion for Agency Review of 
Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Order, to the following: 
Kent P. Gray 
Executive Secretary (UST) 
Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Control Board 
168 North 1950 West 
First Floor 
P.O. Box 144840 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4840 
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BEFORE THE UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS 
WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
-0-
IN RE: DAN TREASE : CASE NO. 960421-CA 
HEARING DATE: MAY 9, 1996 
TRANSCRIPT FROM 
: TAPE-RECORDED PROCEEDINGS 
CERTIFIED COPY 
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FOR THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S OFFICE: MELISSA HUBBELL 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, SUITE 500 
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FOR MR. TREASE: HEINZ J. MAHLER 
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
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-O-
_ . National and Merit Certified Reporters 
f&[)CftlH£ §€1 YlCe, IrC. Expedited Delivery 
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„ , ' . . . . . „ „ Video Depositions 
Phone (801) 531-0256 
KELLY L. BARBER, CSR, RPR 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE CHAIRMAN: Item C on the agenda is a board 
action items decision on motions filed by Dan Trease or 
through his counsel with the attorney general's office. This 
is a (inaudible) packet that is included with this 
information prior to the meeting. Before you is a short 
summary of the issues. I'm not sure if (inaudible) through 
that or not. If not, why don't you take a few minutes to 
read through that. (Inaudible.) 
Rick, let me ask you a question. Where we do 
have a request for a decision on two different motions but 
they are related, do we still handle each one? Would it be 
appropriate to handle each motion separately? 
MR. RATHBUN: Yeah, I think it would in this 
case. Let me explain why. I read the packet this morning. 
Like the board members, I didn't have much time. In order to 
follow it I had to kind of move things in chronological order 
(inaudible) . Basically what you have is an NOV issued by the 
executive secretary, a response filed some time later by 
Mr. Trease, a letter coming back from the executive secretary 
(inaudible) letter coming back from the executive secretary 
saying your response was untimely filed (inaudible) 
Mr. Trease (inaudible). 
The NOV was in February of '95, and in May of 
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KELLY L. BARBER, CSR, RPR 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
'95 Mr. Trease filed his motion to se*: aside the order. 
That started (inaudible). The executive secretary then in 
November '95 issued an order denying the motion to set 
aside. And what is really before you today is Mr. Trease's 
next pleading, which was in December of '95, it is Exhibit 9 
in your packet entitled Trease Motion for Agency Review, 
which under the rule is appropriate to file a request for 
this board to review the executive secretary's order denying 
reconsideration of his initial order. 
That's why there's so many steps in the process 
and the title's (inaudible) kind of confusing because of the 
various steps (inaudible), but that's what's before you. The 
executive secretary then, through Ms. Hubbell of the attorney 
general's office, filed in March of '96 a motion to dismiss 
the motion for agency review, asking for a couple_of things. 
I believe one was that the motion for agency review be 
dismissed, but also that the response to the NOV order filed 
on Mr. Trease be dismissed as untimely. So that's why I 
think you should (inaudible). The executive secretary's 
motion (inaudible). (Inaudible) part of it is a response. 
(Inaudible.) That's my attempt to at least put forth in 
chronological order (inaudible) answers to your questions 
(inaudible) motions. 
Mr. Mahler and Ms. Hubbell are both here today, 
I understand that they agreed to submit this to the board on 
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1 pleadings rather than by oral argument (inaudible) and I'm 
2 sure (inaudible) would be happy to answer any questions. 
3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Discussion amongst 
4 J the board members on the motion, Mr. Trease's counsel's 
5 motion for agency review of order to deny the motion to set 
6 I aside the (inaudible) order. 
7 SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I have one question regarding 
8 the ability to negotiate that bind. If Mr. Trease would have 
9 responded in a timely manner (inaudible) they will be fine, 
10 and if they do not have subsequent violations within the next 
11 12 months they will be, you know, forgiven the other half of 
12 that (inaudible) . If Mr. Trease would have gone ahead and 
13 I properly done this (inaudible) have expected out of this as 
14 far as (inaudible) is that a hard and fast number, or would 
15 that have been (inaudible) that would have (inaudible)? 
16 SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I think that would be 
17 I something that would be a matter of negotiation between the 
18 executive secretary and the party to whom the order was 
19 issued. I don't think there are (inaudible) hard and fast 
20 I rules, I think there's just some general guidelines in terms 
21 I of negotiation. 
22 SPEAKER UNKNOWN: So really this is (inaudible) 
23 situation where the statute provides that the administrative 
24 I (inaudible) of this case can be administrative (inaudible) . 
25 SPEAKER UNKNOWN: As you know we, on just about 
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every meeting this board has on the agenda some situation 
(inaudible) or civil penalties where we don't have the 
authority to administratively impose a penalty, so we try to 
(inaudible) negotiate it, and if we can't negotiate it we 
have to file a civil action. 
This is a little different in the sense that 
the statute clearly authorizes the executive secretary to 
administratively issue and impose the penalty, and the party 
who is the subject of that then under our rules must respond 
within the time set forth in the rules (inaudible) challenge 
otherwise (inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: At the same time they have 
the ability to negotiate --
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Yes. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: -- structure (inaudible) a 
little differently than just a hard and fast (inaudible)? 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Certainly it's (inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: (Inaudible) lost his 
opportunity to renegotiate that by not exercising it? 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: That's the position of the 
executive secretary. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Mr. Chairman, I have some 
sympathy for citizens dealing with government, but a 
principle of policy and law that seems to me has to be that 
you set out certain time frames within which people can 
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exercise their rights. If they don't exercise those rights 
within that time frame, even if the action taken was wrong or 
improper, they forfeit that right. 
And under tab, I think it's one, I looked at 
the order that I guess generated all of this dialogue. On 
the part after the 13th paragraph it says, you may contest 
this notice of violation and order by filing a written 
request for agency action to contest the notice of violation, 
quote, within 30 days after issuance. Then it says who it 
should be filed with and mailed to. And it says, if you do 
not contest this notice of violation as described above, the 
facts specified herein will be deemed true and not subject to 
contest in future administrative or judicial proceedings and 
you will forfeit any right to proceed with an administrative 
or judicial appeal. 
I know that there are some issues raised about 
the notice to legal counsel. And it's, it appears to me that 
there is some discrepancy as to whether or not we could have 
or should have known who the legal counsel for Trease was and 
notified them. However, Mr. Trease (inaudible) received this 
and acknowledged this. And I don't think you have to be an 
attorney when you read something to know that it, that if 
that's what it says, that's probably what it means. 
I hate to take a hard position, but if you 
don't take a position on timing issues, you have no 
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procedure. That allows people basically an unlimited amount 
of time to say, you know, last year I paid this fine or last 
year I was (inaudible) for this and it's just been chewing on 
me ever since then. Now I would like to do something about 
it. 
I guess I am troubled that if we were to set a 
precedent that would be forgiving of a process and procedure 
that, as I read the notice of violation, that the order is 
not unduly difficult for somebody to understand. 
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you (inaudible). Any 
other comments? 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: This has nothing to do, as I 
understand it, with the penalty phase at all. We're only 
dealing with the question of whether or not timing 
(inaudible) was in violation (inaudible); is that correct? 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: That's my understanding. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: In other words that phase 
that follows this (inaudible) shut off the ability of 
Mr. Trease to contest the notice of service (inaudible)? 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Remember that the original 
NOV did assess (inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: $29,500 (inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Excuse me, I guess I didn't 
understand. In other words, final determination (inaudible) 
been made if this action (inaudible)? 
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SPEAKER UNKNOWN: What is the question again? 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Has the final determination 
and penalty been made already if the notice of violation 
isn't available? 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I don't know, Rick. To me 
what we're saying is that the decision, the notice of 
violation, it still is, is not being withdrawn. It still 
stands. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Right, the notice of 
violation (inaudible) order assessing the administrative 
penalty (inaudible). So the motion before you (inaudible) 
procedure but also (inaudible) imposition of that. 
(Inaudible) other right available to Mr. Trease. I think 
that would still uphold the executive secretary's assessment 
(inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: It is a done deal. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: (Inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: As far as the order goes. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Right. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I read through it. There are 
some comments that, a telephone conversation with counsel for 
Mr. Trease that, this is understanding that (inaudible) 
notice of violation (inaudible). The order to me clearly 
says that (inaudible) notice of violation you have to file a 
written request for agency action. So I have a hard time 
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understanding where (inaudible) misunderstand (inaudible) 
conversation (inaudible). 
THE CHAIRMAN: Any other comments or 
discussion? 
Sure, stand up and identify yourself. 
MR. THOMPSON: Yeah, my name is Jerry Thompson, 
I'm (inaudible) environmental health. I just had a question 
on this. My understanding is Mr. Trease made other 
deliveries after that date of the Notice of Violation to 
other people who did not have a certificate of compliance. 
And (inaudible). I was wondering, you know, if he is in 
violation already this makes further, you know, discussion of 
other things that are not in compliance (inaudible). I mean, 
are you aware of that? I was wondering, we (inaudible) 
giving him information. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: The board is not aware of 
that. 
MR. THOMPSON: Oh, (inaudible) . 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Whether the division is or 
not, I can't speak for the division. 
MR. THOMPSON: I'm just wondering. It seems 
like, you were just talking about Hooper Valley Store or 
(inaudible) country store. 
MS. HUBBELL: I believe the (inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I'm sorry, first identify who 
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you are (inaudible). 
MS. HUBBELL: I am sorry, I'm Melissa Hubbell 
(inaudible) setting up hearing dates on some other matters 
(inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: And deliveries to --
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Well, we'll discuss that 
(inaudible). We just want the schedule to be resolved. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Okay, that's part of my 
question then. This really doesn't resolve the entire issue, 
the decisions that are made today. In other words, there 
will be other issues that will need to be determined. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: That's correct. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: (Inaudible) order that is in 
place. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Correct. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: (Inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: (Inaudible) is here, he is 
indicating he would like to make a couple comments to the 
board. I know that Ms. Hubbell and Mr. Mahler had earlier 
indicated with regards to the (inaudible) paperwork. It's at 
the board's discretion obviously, as the board (inaudible) 
asks to address the board (inaudible). So I wanted to pass 
that along (inaudible) will allow. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Thank you, Rick. 
Mr. Chairman. 
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MS. HUBBELL: (Inaudible) Mr. Mahler 
(inaudible) I would like the option to respond. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I think that the item before 
us is directly on the, whether or not we ought to affirm or 
deny the motion for rehearing or appeal. That's all I want 
to hear. I don't want to hear the merits of the other 
issues, because I think we need to separate those. And so I 
don't, I would like to hear from him, but I don't want to 
open this up to the merits of the case. If we do, somebody 
better order sandwiches because we are gonna be here for a 
while. Any other comments? Is the board favorable to listen 
to what Mr. Mahler has to say? 
(Inaudible.) 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Mr. Mahler? 
MR. MAHLER: Thank you. Heinz Mahler on behalf 
of Dan Trease and I agree (inaudible) merits of the case 
(inaudible) before the board (inaudible). What Mr. Trease is 
basically asking is just a concurrence to more or less set 
aside a default that was entered against him. I am not 
planning on making any comments, as I had discussed with 
Ms. Hubbell, but from some of the questions that were asked I 
want to make sure that the board understands specifically 
what is going on. 
Mr. Trease did receive the notice of violation 
of order (inaudible). However, he also received a letter 
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which said that if he had an/ questions about the order he 
could contact Bill Moore. Mr. Trease did call Bill Moore and 
made an appointment with him to meet with Mr. Moore regarding 
this and some other issues (inaudible) other matters 
(inaudible). Now right or wrong (inaudible). Obviously 
(inaudible). I told him (inaudible) response, which we did 
after the 30 days. The executive secretary indicated that 
was not timely, which of course it wasn't, and it would not 
allow to us file a (inaudible) order to recuse, to set the 
order aside. 
So what Mr. Trease is basically asking is that 
he gets his day in court so that these issues, substantive 
issues and questions of whether or not these (inaudible) were 
forwarded in the first place (inaudible) issued against him 
are indeed appropriate (inaudible). Now, under Utah law 
defaults are allowed to be set aside (inaudible). And that's 
what we have here. Mr. Trease made a mistake, you know 
(inaudible). He should have filed a response. He didn't 
think he needed to. He was wrong. But this board 
(inaudible) people do make mistakes (inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Does the executive secretary 
have the ability to state or to (inaudible) or is it this 
board (inaudible). (Inaudible) decided hey, we have 
(inaudible) circumstances, that he had the ability at that 
time? 
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SPEAKER UNKNOWN: My understanding is that he, 
the board, or excuse me, the executive secretary could have, 
all right, said yes, we are able to set a default aside, 
(inaudible) chose not to do that, which is why we were asked 
to do (inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: There is a copy in fact 
(inaudible) this procedure it does mention that the executive 
secretary, the party may seek to have the executive secretary 
set aside the order. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Thank you. Melissa? 
MS. HUBBELL: I have a few brief statements. I 
would like to agree with what Mr. Hardy said (inaudible). 
It's obvious he read all the pleadings, and I know that the 
legal documents are difficult and boring (inaudible) but I 
would agree with him that the point of this is we need to set 
a stance of enforcing the rules and regulations as we have 
set them up. 
We have set up time limits, and every time 
someone violates that time limit we cannot say oh, all right 
that's, you know, we'll excuse you, because there would be no 
point in setting the time limits. And it's more than that in 
this case. In some cases the executive secretary might be 
willing to say all right, you didn't meet the time limit. 
But in the case of Mr. Trease, we had someone here whose 
initial mistake, the notice of violation and order was issued 
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because his initial mistake was he did not have a certificate 
of compliance. He was aware he did not have a certificate of 
compliance and he continued to make the mistake of delivering 
to this tank over (inaudible) 1,161 day period when he didn't 
have the certificate. He delivered a total of 69 times 
himself and had numerous 224 other deliveries by other 
people. So he seems to have a real problem with making 
mistakes in this area, not paying attention to things he's 
sent or read. 
Now, the notice he was sent is very clear. It 
specifically says that you have to file a written response, 
where to send it to, how to send it, what to do, and that you 
will be defaulted if you do not send it. Attached to that is 
a letter which basically says you will find enclosed a notice 
of violation and order regarding illegal deliveries, and the 
little note at the bottom that says if you have any questions 
contact Bill Moore. It doesn't say contacting Bill Moore 
allows you not to have to file a response. 
And further, among these documents is the 
affidavit of Bill Moore, who says that when he was contacted 
by Mr. Trease, and I would like to point out that that 
meeting with Mr. Trease was held after the time that the 
pleadings were due, he, when he did contact with him, had 
contact with him, Mr. Moore swears that Mr. Trease did not 
even discuss the Hooper station but discussed other 
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stations. 
In this case Mr. Trease has been given every 
chance and chose to disregard those chances. This is not a 
case of mistake, this is not a case of inadvertent, this is 
not a case of a citizen who honestly did not understand. It 
seems to me pretty clear it is a case of somebody who simply 
thought he could get away with something and then tried to 
and then (inaudible) didn't work. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Thank you, Melissa. 
MR. MAHLER: May I have three seconds? 
Quickly, famous last words. I thought we weren't gonna talk 
about the merits. The whole issue, this whole discussion 
regarding deliveries (inaudible) compliance, those are 
(inaudible) issues, whether or not he should have had a 
certificate, the state felt he should not (inaudible) , I 
don't think that should be brought into consideration. 
Defaults are entered every day in a court of 
law, and defaults are set aside every day in a court of law 
(inaudible) . 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Mr. Mahler, were you his 
attorney during this period of time? (inaudible) issue or --
MR. MAHLER: No. And as (inaudible) pointed 
out, I represented Dan Trease in a lawsuit that was filed by 
some neighbors (inaudible) regarding (inaudible) and the 
(inaudible) family. And in the context of that I have met 
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with (inaudible) and other members of the DEQ on a number of 
occasions. And my point was that the (inaudible) was aware 
that I had been Mr. Trease's attorney, even though I had not 
had an appearance on those five issues. Obviously I didn't 
know they existed. 
And so yes, it's true I did not represent 
Mr. Trease on the (inaudible) issues at that time, for the 
simple reason that I haven't been asked (inaudible). They 
did know I was out there and that I was Mr. Trease's lawyer, 
(inaudible) related matter. It would have taken, you know, a 
30 sent stamp to let me know (inaudible) was out there and I 
certainly wouldn't have let the 30 days (inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Thank you. 
MS. HUBBELL: (Inaudible) and I want to address 
one point that Mr. Mahler raised, and that is that I was one 
of the people that met with Mr. Mahler concerning the leaking 
(inaudible) storage tank issue (inaudible) . At that time we 
also had some other storage tank compliance issues at the 
(inaudible) country store and I wanted to know if there was 
an attorney that I could talk to because we hadn't been able 
to get Mr. Trease's attention. And I understood Mr. Mahler 
to say that he was not representing Mr. Trease on that issue 
and asked him if he was representing him on the underground 
storage tank enforcement issue. 
After that conversation I understood that he 
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really had nothing to do with it. He was given some 
information that he has (inaudible) Mr. Trease in an attempt 
to resolve these issues. But when it came time to issue the 
notice of violation and order, he had not officially entered 
an appearance of counsel on behalf of Mr. Trease. He hadn't 
notified me that he was representing Mr. Trease on this 
issue, and it seemed to me that it was appropriate for 
Mr. Trease to directly get the notice himself, served on him 
by a constable, and leave it up to him to give it to whoever 
he thought his attorney was at that time, if he had one. So 
that's how we felt about that issue. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Thank you. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Let me ask a little 
clarification (inaudible). This is probably getting into the 
merits and issues (inaudible) just for my clarification. 
There is nothing in the regulations or any of the rules that 
guide how (inaudible) should have required the division would 
have submitted the order to an attorney as opposed to the 
individual that is involved? 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I would have to look at the 
rules (inaudible). I would assume if that is done it's 
usually done as a courtesy, (inaudible) requires it. Formal 
proceedings in court, the rules require that counsel are 
notified and formal administrative hearings (inaudible) 
attorneys. But initial proceedings issuing notice of 
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violation (inaudible) issued to the party. 
MS. HUBBELL: The rule states that if there is 
an attorney of record any documents should be served on them, 
but it was (inaudible) at this time there was not an attorney 
of record. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Thank you. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: (Inaudible) . One of the 
questions concerning the amount of time, as I understand 
(inaudible) earlier question by, if we rule against 
Mr. Trease's motion for a reconsideration we're also 
essentially (inaudible) is the finding that he has no further 
option or negotiation; is that correct? 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: That's right (inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I think it's well for us to 
point out that this is not at issue, because there are 10 
other violations that still must be dealt with. (Inaudible) 
in the letter of notice. That is, I can see that (inaudible) 
the additional possibility (inaudible) those other 10 
violations. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I think I have asked this 
question on other incidences. This amount was not any kind 
of a consent agreement like we talk about with other 
companies, you know, saying... 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I think it was to satisfy the 
executive secretary (inaudible) order. That's right. 
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SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I have asked why is one 
(inaudible) you know (inaudible) come about some discussion, 
but that was not the case. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Particular we talk about 
deliveries to (inaudible) certificate in the statute, that's 
written in the statute, unlike other penalties that we 
address. Tom? 
MR. HARDY: Mr. Chairman, are you ready for a 
motion then? I would like to make a motion that we affirm 
the denial of the request that was entered by the executive 
secretary in this matter on the basis that it was not timely 
filed. 
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you (inaudible) . 
Discussion? 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Are there two motions that 
are needed on this? 
THE CHAIRMAN: That's my understanding. Any 
other comments? All in favor say aye. 
(A vote was taken.) 
THE CHAIRMAN: Do we have any opposed? Thank 
you. 
Okay, the second action item before us today is 
the executive secretary's to dismiss, executive secretary's 
motion to dismission this request. 
(Inaudible.) 
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SPEAKER UNKNOWN: One is to deny the motion and 
the other one is to dismiss the request. That --
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: It appears we just voted on 
the Trease motion for agency review. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: That's correct. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Okay. The other matter 
before you is the executive secretary's motion to dismiss, 
which has two elements. One is to dismiss the motion for 
agency review (inaudible) reaffirmation of what you just did, 
the other is to dismiss the response to the NOV order which 
was filed, which was ruled by the executive secretary to be 
untimely. So I'll move the second motion. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I'll second it. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Thank you. Any discussion? 
Are we clear? 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I wanted to say (inaudible). 
Part of the, each is a part of the other, you know. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: All those in favor, say aye. 
(A vote was taken.) 
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. That takes us on to 
Item D on the agenda, which is setting a hearing date for 
July. It is proposed to be at our regular board meeting 
which would be July 11th, the second Thursday of July. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: (Inaudible) someone explain 
what this hearing involves? 
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ADDENDUM 9 
BEFORE THE UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS 
WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
Dan Trease 
5600 South 5900 West 
Hooper, Utah 
Facility No. 1200241 
This matter came before the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board on May 9, 
1996, on Respondent Dan Trease's Motion for Agency Review of Order Denying Motion to Set 
Aside Notice and Order, and on the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Utah Department of 
Environmental Quality, Division of Environmental Response and Remediation (DERR). The 
Board's review of these two motions was conducted under authority of Utah Code Ann. sections 
19-6-404(3) and 63-46b-12 and Utah Admin. Code section R311-210-3(e). 
The Board, having reviewed the record in this matter, and upon consideration of the 
pleadings, affidavits, motions, memoranda of authorities and arguments of counsel, voted to 
deny the relief requested in Respondent's motion for agency review and to grant DERR's motion 
to dismiss, all for the reasons on that day orally assigned. The Board hereby issues its written 
order on review, as required by Utah Code Ann. section 63-46b-12, with regard to Respondent's 
motion for agency review. 
The Board finds and concludes: that Respondent failed to timely respond to the February 
9, 1995 Notice of Violations and Order (NOV/ORDER) as required by the terms of the order and 
ORDER 
applicable rules, including Utah Admin. Code section R31 l-210-3(d); that under R311-210-
3(d), the NOV/ORDER is final and enforceable by the Executive Secretary; and that insufficient 
grounds exist such as would justify setting aside the NOV/ORDER under the procedures outlined 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for setting aside default judgments. Accordingly: 
IT IS ORDERED: (1) that the Board hereby denies the relief requested in Respondent's 
Motion for Agency Review of Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Notice and Order, and the 
Executive Secretary's order dated November 20,1995 is hereby affirmed without modification; 
(2) that DERR's Motion to Dismiss is granted, dismissing the Respondent's motion for agency 
review and dismissing the response to the NOV/ORDER that was filed by Respondent on or 
about April 4, 1995; and (3) that the NOV/ORDER is final and enforceable. 
NOTICE 
Under Utah Code Ann. section 63-46b-13, any party may request that this Order be 
reconsidered by the Board. Any such request must be in writing, must be filed with the Board 
(with a copy to each party) within twenty days after the date shown on the attached mailing 
certificate, and must state specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
Judicial review of this Order may be sought in the Utah Court of Appeals under 
applicable statutes and court rules, including Utah Code Ann. sections 63-46b-14 and -16 and 
78-2a-3 and Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, by the filing of a proper petition within 
2 
thirty days of the date shown on the attached mailing certificate for this Order (or, if applicable, 
within thirty days after a request for reconsideration is denied). 
DATED this lO^ day of Ma^ 1996. 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS 
WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was served on the 
parties and individuals listed below by placing a copy of the Order in the U.S. mail, properly 
addressed and with first class postage prepaid: 
Heinz J. Mahler 
Kipp & Christian 
City Center 1, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2314 
Melissa M. Hubbell 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140873 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that im copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONER DAN 
TREASE were mailed, first-class postage prepaid, this -JJ day of February, 1997, to the 
following: 
Melissa M. Hubbell 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, #500 
P.O. Box 140873 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
